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Fisheries Management and Development in the EEZ: The
North, South, and Southwest Pacific Experience
William 0. McLean*
and Sompong Sucharitkul**
I. Introduction
A. The Prospect of Extended Maritime Jurisdiction from
the United States' Perspective
The establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ's) has gener-
ated modifications of existing institutional arrangements and creations of
new regional bodies to promote international cooperation in the conser-
vation, management, and development of living resources of the sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' (the "Conven-
tion") has affected fisheries management by authorizing coastal States to
extend their sovereign rights over living and non-living resources sea-
ward up to the outer limits of 200-nautical-mile off-shore areas, 2 mea-
sured from their coastlines which could be drawn as straight baselines.
On a global basis, the areas within the exclusive economic zones of
coastal States cover more than one-third of the surface of ocean space.
More importantly, 95% of the living resources of the sea under commer-
cial exploitation are present in these areas. 3
When President Reagan issued a proclamation on March 10, 1983,
establishing a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone for the United
States, he gave as basis for the unilateral declaration "recognition by in-
ternational law that in the zone beyond its territory and adjacent to its
territorial sea, known as the Exclusive Economic Zone, a coastal State
may assert sovereign rights over natural resources and related jurisdic-
tion." 4 The areas contemplated by this Presidential proclamation, which
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1 Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 U.N. Sales No. E.83V.5 (1983) [hereinafter U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea]. The Convention was signed by 119 nations and the Final Act
also by 23 other delegations on December 10, 1982. The Convention will enter into force 12
months following the date of deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification or accession.
2 Id., arts. 56(a) & 57. The 200 mile off-shore area includes the territorial sea and the exclusive
economic zones.
3 Report of the ACMRR Working Party on the Scientific Basis for Determining Management Measures
(Hong Kong, Dec. 10-15, 1979), FAO Fisheries Rep. No. 236, at 1.
4 Proclamation No. 5030 (Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 600 (1983). See also
Statement by the President of the United States on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States Ocean Policy
(Mar. 10, 1983), reprinted in 23 VA.J. INT'L L. 598 (1983) (hereinafter "Reagan Proclamation of Mar.
10, 1983").
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established sovereign rights over resources and jurisdiction over activi-
ties, encompass some 3.9 billion acres, significantly more than the 2.3
billion land acres of the United States and its territories. The exact size
of the EEZ proclaimed by the United States depends on whether certain
or all Pacific island territories are included. 5
Since this historic proclamation, there has been no executive decree
to explore this vast expanse of generally unknown aquatic wilderness.
With regard to oil and natural gas, for instance, only three percent of the
newly acquired acreage has been explored.6 The purpose of this article
is to examine some of the main options open to the United States in the
operation of its EEZ's, particularly with regard to the management and
development of the living resources of the sea. This article concentrates
on the North Pacific area and the South and Southwest Pacific region. It
analyzes relevant issues in light of the experience and policy options
adopted by the United States and their possible coordination and harmo-
nization, including factors which may have influenced the current trends
in the practice of the United States. It is on the basis of governmental
practice, especially the treaty practice of the United States, that the pres-
ent study will be made.
B. 2he General Interests and Concerns of the United States
and the New Law of the Sea
The United States Delegation signed the Final Act of the Third Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea along with 141 other nations on December
10, 1982, but refused to sign the Convention itself, principally because of
U.S. concerns about deep seabed mining provisions. The United States,
independently of treaty obligations, accepted those provisions which are
consistent with its own determinable interests and endeavored to estab-
lish firm rules of international law, through State practice and usages as
evidence of customary rules of international law, binding all nations to
those provisions.7
Without entering the arena of acrimonious debate as to the wisdom
of the oceans policy maintained by the current administration of the
United States, it is submitted that, consistent with the long line of U.S.
long-term policy supportive of the integrity of international law and
universality of international regimes of oceans law, in the long run the
Convention of 1982, despite its human fallabilities and imperfections,
constitutes the best balance of interests and concerns of all nations:
large and small, rich and poor, coastal and land-locked, naturally en-
dowed and geographically disadvantaged. Many respected American ju-
rists believe that the Convention as a whole serves the best interests of
5 "The significance of the E.E.Z. to the future of our country may well be greater than the 1803
Louisiana purchase...." The Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States: Some Immediate Policy Issues,
National Advisory Committe on Oceans and Atmosphere, Special Report to the President and Congress (1984). Cf.
Ryan, The Exclusive Economic Zone, OCEANUS, Winter 1984-85, at 3. See Annex I.
6 See Ryan, supra note 5, at 3.
7 "Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding
upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, committed as such." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969, entered into forceJan. 27, 1980).
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mankind and essentially those of the American nation.8 Without pursu-
ing the ultimate goal of oceans law and policy to its logical conclusions,
we may proceed to examine some of the vital interests and concerns of
the United States in the Exclusive Economic Zones of both the United
States and other coastal and island States in the areas or regions under
active consideration, the North Pacific and the South and Southwest Pa-
cific regions.
Regardless of whether or not the United States will sign and ratify or
accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982,
one thing is clear. The United States is basing its proclamation of the
EEZ on the provisions of the 1982 Convention, regarding them as gener-
ating rules of customary international law. Never for one moment has
the United States avowedly forsaken international law as a sound and
solid basis for its actions in the field of international relations. Yet, in
adopting unilateral measures, such as the Presidential proclamation,
which is likely to be implemented by other more detailed administrative
regulations, the United States cannot afford to create disharmonies or
inconsistencies within its own government instrumentalities or with the
customary rules of international law.9 Each time a State adopts national
legislation to give effect to international obligations, there is a risk of
inconsistencies and conflicts in the interpretations or applications by
States and the government agencies competent in the fields. Therefore,
States should exercise maximum caution to minimize, if not altogether to
avoid, the risk of conflicts and inconsistencies in national understandings
and implementations of treaty provisions.' 0 The ensuing study will ob-
serve the extent to which unilateral declarations by States, especially the
Reagan Proclamation of 1983, conform to, comply with, or derogate
from the relevant provisions of the 1982 Convention on the international
regime of the Exclusive Economic Zones.
C. The Particular Interests and Specific Concerns of the United States in
Regard to Fisheries Management and Development in the Exclusive
Economic Zones
Contrary to the view advanced by some and conceded by others that
the establishment of the EEZ's by the 1982 Convention confers upon
coastal States "sovereignty" or "imperium" over all living and non-living
resources of the sea present within the confines of the maritime bounda-
ries of coastal States, the new law of the sea merely authorizes coastal
States to exercise "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and ex-
8 See, e.g., the view of Ambassador Elliot Richardson, formerly Head of the U.S. Delegation to
the Third Law of the Sea Conference.
9 The cogent arguments articulated in Belsley, A Strategy to Avoid Conflicts, OCEANUS, Winter
1984-85, at 19-22, appear to be convincing.
10 For an overall assessment of the 1982 Convention, see, e.g., the remarks by Tommy T. B. Koh
of Singapore, President of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in A Constitution for the
Oceans, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 at xxxiii-xxxvii (1983), adapted from statements by the President on
Dec. 6 and 11, 1982, at the final session of the Conference at Montego Bay.
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ploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil."'I
The sovereign rights as specified in the Treaty provisions do not
constitute "sovereignty" or "imperium" which would necessarily encom-
pass "ownership" or "dominium," thereby implying automatic vesting of
property rights of the coastal States to the living and non-living re-
sources of the sea found within its extended maritime jurisdiction, or
EEZ. 12 In point of fact as well as of law, no right of ownership over the
living resources of the sea could be said to have been transferred to the
coastal State or any agency exercising fishery management authority.
Nor do the transboundary species of all sizes and ages recognize the sov-
ereignty or ownership by any coastal State. Neither sovereign rights nor
indeed fishery management authority can be identified with "sover-
eignty" of the coastal State.13
Having clearly distinguished "sovereignty" from "sovereign rights,"
including the power to regulate, control and manage fishery develop-
ment in the EEZ,'it remains to be asserted that the coastal State neverthe-
less retains the authority exclusively to explore, exploit, conserve and
manage the living resources within its zone, free of interference from
external powers or non-nationals, except as authorized by the coastal
State, and only to the extent and subject to the conditions and limitations
contained in: the authorization.
The specific regime of EEZ, being the creation of the 1982 Conven-
tion, is a product of consensus achieved after a series of protracted nego-
tiations. It contains in itself an integral body of governance or rules
governing the rights, duties, obligations, and responsibilities of coastal
States and other States in their mutual relations. Such a regime cannot
exist without the reciprocal'cooperation of all States concerned. It would
lead to utter chaos if one State, however powerful and righteous, could
claim to exercise the rights and reap the benefits under the EEZ provi-
sions of the Convention, but couild refuse to recognize the similar rights
and privileges of others under the same Treaty provisions, or could be
heard to reject the obligations incumbent upon it under the Conven-
tion.' 4 Nor could this exceptional or privileged position be attained
through the process of self-proclaimed immunity from the international
regime wherever, and whenever the. State is required to fulfill an obliga-
tion, while accepting all the benefits and harvesting all the fruits of the
11 Rights, Jurisdiction, and Duties of the Coastal States in the Exclusive Economic Zone, U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 56(I)(a), at 18.
12 For the non-living resources, exploitation is necessary, even'before processing could com-
mence. For the living resources of the sea, the species have to be caught before being processed into
fishery product, whether fresh, frozen or canned.
13 Transboundary species owe no allegiance to any coastal State. Nor do they recognize any
boundary line, either between adjacent States, or between a coastal State and the high seas. Unless
and until caught, fish are the living resources of the sea, not of any State or any fisherman in
particular.
14 For instance, under article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/27 (1969, entered into forceJan. 27, 1980), "a state exercising a right [as non-paity to
a treaty] shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in
conformity with the treaty."
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oceans regardless of the rights of others or of its own duties and respon-
sibilities towards other States or mankind in general. 15
1. The United States as a Coastal State
As a coastal State, the United States' interests in the management
and development of fisheries within its EEZ cannot be any different from
those of other coastal States. The United States, no less ardently than
other coastal States, is striving to promote the objective of optimum utili-
zation of the living resources in the zone. 16 It must determine the allow-
able catch of the living resources within this zone, 17 as well as its capacity
to harvest them.' 8 It is the duty of the coastal State, taking into account
the best scientific evidence available to it, to ensure through proper con-
servation and management measures that the maintenance of living re-
sources is not endangered by over-exploitation. As appropriate, the
coastal State is under an obligation to cooperate to this end with compe-
tent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or
global.' 9 Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maxi-
mum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and eco-
nomic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing
communities. The special interests and concerns of the United States as
a coastal State may be considered to be best served by the principles
incorporated in the provisions of the 1982 Convention in regard to the
rights of the coastal State within its own EEZ. This is true whether the
power to regulate and manage the living resources is to be viewed as
"sovereignty" or merely "sovereign rights." No question of ownership
of the living resources or their registration or nationality needs to be
examined. It is sufficient that the living resources within the zone are
subject to the control, regulation and whatever measures of conservation
may be deemed appropriate by the coastal State.
It would appear to be in the best interest of the United States, as a
coastal State, to observe the rules of customary international law derived
from treaty provisions, as they seem to furnish sufficient latitude and dis-
cretion for coastal States to regulate, control, manage, and develop all
living resources within the Exclusive Economic Zone. Whatever the
United States may choose to adopt by way of legislation or other unilat-
eral measures within the purview of the permissive rules of international
law, the United States is obliged to respect the rules of other coastal
States to do likewise, or even to do differently within the permissible ba-
sic principles authorized by the treaty provisions. A single State cannot
15 Belsky, in A Strategy to Avoid Conflicts, OCEANUS, Winter 1984-85, at 22, suggested that "the
best method to implement this policy would be national legislation committing us to the settlement
procedures detailed in the Law of the Sea Treaty with any nation that agrees to apply those proce-
dures with us."
16 The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 62, para. I, at 21 (Utilization of
the Living Resources, objective of optimum utilization).
17 Id., art. 61, para. 1, at 20 (Conservation of the Living Resources, allowable catch).
18 Id., art. 62, para. 2, at 21 (capacity to harvest).
19 Id., art. 61, para. 2, at 20. See also paras. 4 & 5.
[Vol. 63:492
EEZ FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
create rules of customary international law derogatory of the existing
practice of other States.
2. The United States as a Fishing Nation
Coastal States have found it necessary to manage and conserve living
resources within the 200-mile zone off their shores, motivated, as they
were, by self-protection and self-preservation in the face of over-fishing
and possible depletion of stocks within the zones close to their shorelines
by shifting fleets of other nations.20 Yet, these same coastal States can-
not be totally unaware of the fact that their own nationals also operate
fishing fleets, either for commercial exploitation or simply for sport,
within off-shore areas of their immediate or distant neighbors. Fishing
fleets flying the United States flag, for instance, are engaged actively in
distant water fishing, particularly in regard to transboundary and highly
migratory species, notably tuna.21 Thus, the United States, not unlike
other distant-water fishing nations, would also like to protect national
fleets fishing in distant waters. This protective interest extends beyond
the territorial limits and national jurisdiction of the United States. It fol-
lows American fishing fleets wherever and whenever they may find them-
selves on fertile fishing grounds, whether within the United States' own
EEZ's or on the high seas where there are undisputed freedoms, includ-
ing fishing, or indeed well within the EEZ's of other nations.
In this connection, the protective interests of the United States are
akin to those of other more active distant-water fishing nations, such as
Japan, the Soviet Union and Thailand. The only difference may lie in the
attitude of the flag State in extending their protective arms in support of
their national fishing industries. Clearly, EEZ's are unilaterally pro-
claimed. Their respect may well depend on the degree of recognition by
other States. It is not unnatural therefore that the United States, like
other fishing nations, is prepared to observe the 200-mile fishing zone of
other coastal States. Disputes may relate to discrepancies between the
delimitation recognized by the United States and the 200-mile zones pro-
claimed by other coastal States.22
Some distant-water fishing nations have been reluctant to declare
their 200-mile exclusive fishery or economic zones lest their declaration
be inconsistent with the activities of their own fishing fleets within the
200-mile zones of other States. They would rather have the fishing ves-
sels of their nationals operating in distant waters within the 200-mile
zone of other far away lands than exclude foreign fishing fleets from their
20 For instance, off the Canadian east coast, the fishing effort doubled between 1960-73, led by
the appearance of distant-water fleets from the Soviet Union, Japan and eleven other European
countries. B. JOHNSON, CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 56 (1977). See also
comments and tables in V. KACZYNSKI, DISTANT-WATER FISHERIES AND THE 200-MILE ECONOMIC
ZONE 2-9 (1983).
21 For instance, the landings of tuna by U.S. fishermen in 1986 were 555 million pounds, valued
at $217.2 million, an 8% increase over 1985. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8385, FISHERIES OF THE U.S. viii 1986 (1987)
[hereinafter CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8385].
22 See, e.g., the position of the United States government as reflected in Reagan Proclamation of
Mar. 10, 1983, supra note 4.
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own already overfished or depleted 200-mile off-shore zones. It is diffi-
cult to have it both ways without being inconsistent or self-contradictory.
Thus, a coastal State cannot be heard to claim a 200-mile zone for itself
while in the same vein allowing its fishing fleets to fish in the 200-mile
zone of its neighbors or of other distant States. Such a claim would not
be well received by other countries. Yet, modem States, large or small,
would leave no stone unturned in trying to protect their national inter-
ests in every possible way.
The United States is no exception. It has considerable experience in
experimenting with the art of the possible. Thus, in the Reagan Procla-
mation declaring the 200-mile EEZ, the United States has disclaimed ju-
risdiction or sovereign rights over highly migratory species, such as tuna.
This United States position would not appear to be inconsistent with its
own posture in protecting U.S. fishing fleets harvesting tuna within the
200-mile zone off the coasts of other nations in the South and Southwest
Pacific. Thus, the United States, as a country with its own EEZ and as a
distant-water fishing nation, appears to be able to claim the best of both
worlds. To what extent can such a practice be tolerated by other na-
tions?23 Conflicts of interests are inevitable. It remains to be seen how
such differences could be or might to some extent have been resolved. 24
II. Delimitation of Regions and Identification of Problem Areas
Under Consideration
Having cleared the introductory path, it is now opportune to pro-
ceed to narrow down the geographical scope of the present enquiry and
focus attention on more definitive problem areas within range of closer
examination. For purposes of illustrative comparison, we have selected
as geographical regions for our study two roughly defined regional or
sub-regional areas, designated as the North Pacific and the South and
Southwest Pacific, respectively. The problem areas that call for immedi-
ate attention in connection with the regime of fishery conservation and
management in the EEZ's of interested States within these two regions
may be identified from two different, adjacent, often diametrically oppo-
site standpoints. These are the point of view of coastal States, primarily
interested in the optimum utilization of the living resources of the sea
within their own 200-mile zones on the one hand, and the perspective of
distant-water fishing nations whose traditional fishing grounds are being
rescinded. In the North Pacific, the United States may be qualified as
predominantly a coastal State, whereas in the South and Southwest Pa-
cific the United States is identifiable as a distant-water fishing nation,
whose stand and viewpoints need to be fully taken into consideration.
For convenience sake, therefore, the North Pacific may be inspected from
23 The U.S. position dates back to the 1950's, as noted by Healey, United States Tuna MVanagement
Policy, INT'L L.J. 84-85 (1981). Thus, the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1970 does
not include, nor extend to, highly migratory species. The Reagan Proclamation merely reaffirmed
this position. See also Burke, Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 308-09 (1984).
24 See infra notes 105-34 and accompanying text, especially in the context of the treaty between
the United States and members of the South Pacific Forum of April 2, 1987.
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the point of view of a coastal State which clearly reverses its role in re-
gard to the South and Southwest Pacific.
A. The North Pacific and United States' EEZ's
The North Pacific is bordered by huge coastal States and includes
some of the most vigorous fishing fleets. The richest fishing grounds
within the EEZ's of coastal State in the North Pacific region belong to the
United States and Canada. On the other hand, the most active fishing
nations in the area have traditionally beenJapan, the Republic of Korea,
and the U.S.S.R. The immediate concern is with the EEZ's of the United
States in this region. We will study the practice of the United States as a
coastal State in the wake of the new law of the sea. We will examine how
effectively a coastal State can take legislative and administrative measures
to ensure the optimum utilization of its resources within this newly-ac-
quired maritime zone.
1. Geographical Area
There are at least two separate areas or sub-regions within the geo-
graphical scope of this inquiry: i) off the coasts of Alaska in the Arctic
Ocean adjacent to the Canadian EEZ (Beaufort Sea) to the east, and op-
posite the Soviet coast (Chukchi Sea) to the west, and in the North Pacific
around the Aleutian Islands, opposite the Soviet coasts bordering the
Bering Sea and adjacent to the Canadian Pacific coast to the south and
southeast of Alaska; and ii) off the United States west coast, adjacent to
the Canadian coast in the northwest and to the Mexican coast in the
southwest.
As the Arctic issues present different challenges, it might be appro-
priate to leave them for future consideration. For present purposes, the
study is confined to the U.S. EEZ's in the North Pacific including the
Bering Sea, but excluding the zone close to the Beaufort Sea bordered by
Canada and the United States and the Chukchi Sea on the Soviet side.
The Arctic Ocean is not within the scope of the current inquiry. The
problems in that polar region assume an entirely different character.
2. The Problem Areas
The problem areas in the U.S. zone under current consideration
concern principally the development, conservation and7 management of
fisheries and stocks within the extended exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States or the 200-mile zone off the Alaskan coast and the west
coasts of the United States. This investigation covers exploration, data-
collecting, stock generating, conservation measures, harvesting, produc-
tion, processing, and distribution. Interests include allocation of quotas,
licensing of foreign fishing vessels, joint ventures in terms of investment
of capital and capital goods as well as technology and its transfer. The
exploration also includes identification and location of stocks and identi-
fication of transboundary species, studies of their habits and movements,
recycling and reproduction including hatchery, culture, marine biology
including artificial insemination to enhance breeding, and production.
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Also examined is the determination of maximum sustainable catch and
capacity to harvest as well as allocation of surplus to foreign vessels, joint
ventures and eventual exclusion or phasing out of foreign fishing fleets.
The economics and politics of fishery development, management and
conservation will be examined in the light of the practical experience of
the United States.
The problem areas thus outlined are enormous in the EEZ's of the
North Pacific region. The problems facing coastal States in the North
Pacific are very complex and yet illustrate, and to some extent are typical
of, the wide range of challenges to be met by States actively concerned
with fisheries development, management and conservation within and
without the EEZ's. For one thing, not all coastal States enjoy the same
luxury or share of good fortune of opulence and munificence. The
United States, Mexico (to the South) and Canada (in between Alaska and
the west coast) may be said to fall into this privileged category of State,
whose coastal seas abound with multitudes of fishes of almost all valuable
species, whether as human food or as industrial products. These are the
nations endowed with richness in natural living resources beyond the
dreams of avarice. 25
Between the United States and Canada, as between the United
States and Mexico, there are bilateral problems due to geographical
proximity and to the existence of transboundary species as well as stocks
occurring within the EEZ's of two or more coastal States or both within
the zone and in the area beyond and adjacent thereto. 26 Conservation
measures appear to be desirable both for the anadromous stocks
originating in the river or rivers of one of the coastal States27 and catad-
romous species which may spend more time in the waters of one of the
adjacent coastal States.28 These problems could only be resolved with
the consultation, concurrence and agreements or arrangements among
all the coastal States concerned. Measures unilaterally adopted by one of
the interested coastal States without such consultation may only serve to
aggravate the matter by reducing the regulating State's stock within the
EEZ and encouraging unrestricted harvesting in the zone of its neighbor-
ing coastal State. It has not been without trials and tribulations that the
United States has been able to resolve some of the major fishery
problems with its neighbor to the south (Mexico) and in the middle (Can-
ada) within the North Pacific region.29
The second category of coastal States in the North Pacific region is
not as fortunate. While the United States EEZ's contain approximately
15 percent of total world catch of seafood, including shellfish, various
species that can be harvested in the EEZ's of other coastal States in the
25 See, e.g., table of statistics of the quantities of the species harvested in pounds or tons and their
values in dollars for the recent years in CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8385, supra note 2 1.
26 See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 63, at 22. See also id. art. 64
(Highly Migratory Species) and art. 65 (Marine Mammals), at 22.
27 See id. art. 66, at 22.
28 See id. art. 67, at 23.
29 See, e.g., Bower & Hennessey, U.S. EEZ Relations with Canada and Mexico, OCEANUS, Winter
1984-85, at 41-43 and Colson, Transboundary Fishery Stocks in the EEZ, OCEANUS, Winter 1984-85, at
48-51.
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North Pacific region are nowhere comparable to the abundance of the
living resources of the sea off the U.S. North Pacific coasts. These other
coastal nations are obliged to seek their fishing grounds to feed them-
selves as well as for processing as export products. They are actively
fishing within their zones, making arrangements for mutually tolerable
exchanges and adopting agreed conservation measures among them-
selves, and conducting distant-water fishing in the high seas beyond their
EEZ's as well as within the exclusive fishery zones of other coastal States.
This category of coastal States includes China, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and the U.S.S.R. Each has a national fishing fleet capable of fish-
ing and has established fishing habits within a distance of less than 200
miles from the coastlines of the U.S., Canada and the U.S.S.R. Of
course, the United States and Canadian zones are the more plentiful. We
will focus on the U.S. zones and the U.S. fishery arrangements with other
States from the North Pacific region such as China, Japan, Korea, and the
U.S.S.R., as well as from beyond the region, such as Poland. We will see
how from 1976 the United States has managed to substitute its own fish-
ing fleets by progressively phasing out virtually all foreign flags from its
EEZ's without drastic measures.
B. The South Pacific Island States' EEZ's and the United States
The next geographical region under current study is the South and
Southwest Pacific. This region covers roughly all the island States in the
South and Southwest Pacific ocean, notably members of the Pacific Fo-
rum. The full title is the "South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency"
(F.F.A.), a recently formed international organization for the specific
purposes of fisheries management and conservation.30 The problem ar-
eas to be examined concern principally the management and conserva-
tion measures for highly migratory species, notably tuna, within the
region and the attitude and activities of interested States from outside
the region, especially the United States.
1. The Pacific Island States
As a regional grouping for present purposes, the members of the
F.F.A. appear to occupy a place of prominence in our study of fisheries
development, management and conservation undertaken by the region
as a whole. A quick glance at the South and Southwest Pacific region
shows a fast developing group of newly emerged island nations, which
until recently did not enjoy self-governing status.
a. The F.F.A.: Australia and New Zealand
The group also includes two relatively older nations, members of the
British Commonwealth, otherwise included in the group within the
United Nations informally designated as "Western European and
others." Australia and New Zealand rank among the "others" within the
30 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention of 1979, FAO Fisheries Rep. No. 293, 201-
204 (1983); see also International Environmental Law-Multilateral Treaties, N. B2UB7/VI/82.
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Western European group for practical and election purposes. Members
of this group are all developed countries. However, within the F.F.A.
Australia and New Zealand have very different roles to play. They consti-
tute active regional members of the F.F.A. with distinct responsibilities,
not only as former administering powers for some of the newly in-
dependent territories, but also for their own respective welfare and na-
tional interests which for reasons of geographic proximity are inherently
linked to those of the smaller developing island nations.
b. The F.F.A.: Developing Island States
The newly emerged developing island nations constitute a growing
group of coastal States in the South and Southwest Pacific. Their liveli-
hood has been made viable by the new law of the sea. The notion of
archipelagic waters and the EEZ's give them new sustenance of life, a
new lease on a reasonable chance to attain an adequate standard of living
expected of every human being under the International Covenant of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 31 Their inhabitants traditionally
survive on the living resources of the sea and on what little income they
can derive from licensing or from fees collected in exchange for fishing
rights. These rights are universally recognized as their sovereign rights
within their exclusive 200-mile zones. Furthermore, their basic right to
survival is a legitimate collective and individual human right. It is also
guaranteed by the International Bill of Rights.3 2 No one can deny them
such basic rights and fundamental freedoms as rights of man and as sov-
ereign rights of any people.
Those Pacific island nations are no richer than the countries often
classified as the least developed countries. Nor are they endowed with
other living or non-living resources, either inland or offshore. The rising
membership of this group, in addition to Australia and New Zealand
includes:
Cook Islands Fiji
Republic of Kiribati Republic of the Marshall
Federated State of Republic of Palau
Micronesia Islands Niue
Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands
Kingdom of Tonga Tuvalu
Western Samoa Republic of Vanuatu
31 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, December 16, 1966,
entered into forceJanuary 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 220 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
32 The International Bill of Rights includes the following U.N. instruments:
(1) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948), G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948);
(2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 490;
(3) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52; and
(4) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 59,
recognizing the competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communica-
tions from individuals claiming to be victims of human rights violations.
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c. French and American Polynesia
Another group of island territories lies within or in the vicinity of the
Southwest Pacific region, which, for want of a better expression, may be
referred to as "non self-governing Polynesian island territories." They
include French Polynesia, Tahiti (Papete), New Caledonia (Numea) and
the American Polynesian territories such as American Samoa. In addi-
tion, the United States extends its metropolitan territory to cover not
only the fiftieth State of Hawaii, but also several other Pacific islands,
notably, Jarvis Island and American Samoa. Other territories in the Pa-
cific Ocean, such as Baker Islands, Guam, Howland, Johnston Atoll,
Northern Mariana Islands, Midway and Wake, lie north of the equator.
These American Pacific islands present no problem for our current inves-
tigation. French Polynesia, New Caledonia as well as Tahiti, present
problems of different strategic interests, not to the native inhabitants as
such but more specifically as testing grounds for French nuclear explo-
sion experiments. The United States had earlier made use of Pacific ter-
ritories for that same purpose 33, as had the British slightly later.3 4 But
neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has persisted to make
use of their Pacific islands for nuclear testing in recent years. Only the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs made unilateral Statements, in the
wake of international litigation instituted by Australia and New Zealand,
in the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1974, to the
effect that France "has reached a stage in her nuclear technology that
makes it possible to continue the program by underground testing."3 5
Whereupon the International Court of Justice reached the conclusion
that there was no longer any dispute or issue to be decided. The Court
decision has proven groundless as France resumed nuclear explosion
tests in 1981.36 As recently as August, 1987, a representative of France
openly and unabashedly admitted that France has resumed interests in
New Caledonia and Tahiti because of the new law of the sea, recognizing
200-mile zone in which France could exercise certain sovereign rights.
As nuclear testing in metropolitan France is precluded by demographic
reasons, France has been compelled to resume the conduct of nuclear
tests in the Pacific.3 7
33 In 1954, radiation from hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United States in the area of
the Eniweton Atoll in the Strategic Trust Territory administered by the United States caused death
and injury to Japanese fishermen. DJ. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 322
(3d ed. 1983).
34 The U.K. conducted nuclear tests on the high seas near Christmas Island in the Pacific, 1957-
58. Id. at 321, n.36 (Nuclear Tests in the Pacific).
35 The claim "no longer has any object," and "the court is therefore not called upon to give a
decision thereon." 1974 I.CJ. 253, 457.
36 D.J. HARRIS, supra note 33, at,323 n.36. In 1981, when underground testing in Africa became
difficult, the position shifted and nuclear tests were resumed by France in the Pacific. See also the
Rainbow Warrior incident, 1985, recounted in D. ROBIE, EYES OF FIRE, THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE
RAINBOW WARRIOR (1986).
37 See the deliberation at the 20th Annual Conference of the Law- of the Sea Institute, Hawaii,
Aug. 4-7, 1986.
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d. Non-regional Powers
States outside the region under consideration which have displayed
keen interests in assuming or resuming activities within the South and
Southwest Pacific region consist of a number of former or current colo-
nial powers. The principal interested States, the Soviet Union and the
United States, as super-powers, clearly have general as well as security
interests above all. There had been a security breach in parts of this re-
gion during World War II. Japan, once the belligerent, hostile invader of
the Pacific, has changed its war-like posture and emerged as a peaceful
trader and demonstrated genuine interest in fishing in South Pacific wa-
ters within the 200-mile zones off the island nations. Soviet Union and
United States nationals have continued to fish in these zones with or
without the authorization of coastal States and often, regardless of re-
gional regulations, pending the conclusion of agreements with these is-
land nations.
Apart from fisheries, France and traditionally also the United King-
dom were original members of the old South Pacific Forum (not to be
confused with the F.F.A.), composed of the United States, United King-
dom, France, Australia and New Zealand. This was an organization es-
tablished in 1948 to promote peace and orderly development within the
South Pacific. 38 The major powers were entrusted with responsibilities
for administering territories in the region. The problem has been one of
safeguarding the primary interest and well-being of the inhabitants of the
Pacific territories.
2. The Management and Conservation of Highly Migratory Species in
the South Pacific
While there are countless problem areas that may fascinate legal
scholars interested in the studies of the South Pacific, attention is focused
on one specific problem area, namely, the development, management
and conservation of highly migratory species in the South Pacific by the
F.F.A.. It will be seen how members of the F.F.A. are coping with the
situation and encroachments of their EEZ's which may be compared to
the regulatory measures taken by the coastal States such as Canada and,
more directly on point, the United States, in the North Pacific. It is inter-
esting to appreciate the gradual evolution of acceptance of norms that
are valid and applicable in the South as they have been in the North
Pacific.
It will be seen how, in this connection, the United States, as a Chris-
tian nation, has demonstrated for the North Pacific region unbounded
generosity even towards its rivals, current and former, beyond the call of
justice and the dictates of humanity. 39 On the other hand, an opposite
attitude appears to have been adopted for the South and Southwest Pa-
38 See the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, Feb. 6, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
2317. This was succeeded and superseded by the new South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency in
1979, FAO Fisheries Rep. No. 293, at 201-204 (1983) composed of purely regional members, includ-
ing Australia, New Zealand, and the South Pacific island States.
39 See infra notes 41-104 and accompanying text.
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cific region. It will be seen how slowly justice, humane and humanitarian
considerations painfully moved forward and ultimately prevailed, given
an appropriate promotion to reactivate the instinct of survival in the face
of the hard realities of international life.40
III. Fisheries Management and Development in the North Pacific EEZ
of the United States
Facing the challenge posed by foreign fishing fleets within the region
designated as the North Pacific as defined and delimited in section II.A.
above,41 a closer examination will be made of the problem areas therein
identified. 42 It is with generosity, compassion and understanding that
the United States has approached the problems and challenges facing
this richly endowed coastal nation under the new law of the sea. The
stage has been set for the ultimate takeover by the United States of all the
living and nonliving resources within its EEZ, assuming rightful control
and exercising sovereign rights over a wide variety of stocks of highly
precious species within the 200-mile zones of its national maritime juris-
diction. The final takeover is to coincide with the eventual and gradual
phasing out of all foreign fishing fleets from the fishing grounds where
they have either traditionally or recently been conducting fishery activi-
ties, harvesting and developing the valuable species that correspond to
the increasing market demands of the time. The market has been culti-
vated in the United States and further expanded in the Asian Pacific re-
gion by the United States with particular insistence on increasing United
States shares in the growing Asian and Pacific markets.
During the transitional stage, the United States has skillfully man-
aged to catch a comfortable ride on the rising tide favoring extension of
exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State for the management and con-
servation of stocks within the marine area up to the distance of 200 miles
measured from its coastlines. The best national interests of the United
States have been clearly perceived and fully served in the management
and conservation of worthy stocks.
A. Pre-1976 Setting
The situation prevailing prior to the Magnuson Act of 1976 deserves
special mention. In the area under consideration, the North Pacific as a
whole constitutes the single most significant fishing region. A glance at
recent statistics'shows that in 1974, for instance, out of the total world
catch of 82.8 million metric tons (mt.), 26.4 mt. (31.9 percent) were
caught in the North Pacific, of which 23.7 mt. were harvested in the
Northwest Pacific (FAO Area 61). 4 3 In 1975, just before extensions of
national jurisdiction by coastal States in the region, the North Pacific ac-
counted for 27.6% of the total world catch. China and North Korea de-
rived their catches exclusively from this region, South Korea 89.9% and
40 See infra notes 105-34 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
42 See id
43 58 FAO, YEARBOOK OF FISHERY STATISTICS (Catches and Landings), 1984, Table A-i (1986).
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the Soviet Union 33.3%.44 The United States in that period was harvest-
ing from the area only 12.5% of its total production and for Canada the
percentage was also only 13%. 4 5 In the world of fisheries, these statistics
indicate very high stakes for many interested parties.
International control or regulation of fishery in the North Pacific
before 1976 was sporadic if not chaotic. It was also extremely complex.
Several agreements were operational, mostly bilateral and trilateral, cov-
ering a minimal number of stocks. In fact most of the stocks were ex-
ploited without regulation. 46 Extension of jurisdiction by coastal States
was initially limited to sedentary fishing or continental shelf resources
such as Alaskan crab. Apart from the International Whaling Commis-
sion, a world-wide body established in the United Kingdom by the 1946
Convention to adopt resource regulations,47 three multilateral long-term
agreements were applicable: the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission
(NPFSC), the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC)
and the Commission for Fisheries Research in the Western Pacific
(CFRWP), which had become virtually inactive by 1967.48 Side by side
with the multilateral conventions, there were in addition six long-term
bilateral agreements, including the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission (IPSFC) between the U.S. and Canada, and four sets of in-
tergovernmental and non-governmental agreements between Japan and
the U.S.S.R., the Republic of Korea (South) and China and the Demo-
cratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North) and China. Finally, there were
nine ad hoc short-term bilateral agreements in force in the Northeast
Pacific.49
The impact of extended jurisdiction has been comprehensive in the
region. All stocks are now regulated, most of the ad hoc, short-term ar-
rangements have been replaced, the long-term bilateral and multilateral
agreements have been substantially amended to be of continued use, the
Japan-U.S.S.R. bilateral arrangement was significantly modified, while ja-
pan-Korea (South), Japan-China, and China-Korea (North) bilateral ar-
rangements have continued to function.
The advent of extended jurisdiction primarily struckJapan like a vol-
canic eruption, so soon after the oil shock of the Fall of 1973. The Re-
public of Korea and even Thailand, as distant-water fishing nations, were
similarly stultified. The United States took the initiative of unilaterally
extending her exclusive jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles in 1976,
followed closely by Canada in the same year and by the U.S.S.R. in 1977.
44 See, e.g., E. MILES, ET AL., THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE REGIONS: THE NORTH PACIFIC Table
1.1 (1982).
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., H. Kasahara & W.T. Burke, North Paific Fisheries Management, Resources for the Future
(RFF), Programme of International Studies for Fisheries Arrangements 39-50 (Paper 2, Washington,
D.C., 1973).
47 Membership of the Commission includes most coastal States of the North Pacific, China, Ja-
pan, Korea (Republic of), U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. See Carroz, International Aspect of Fishery Management
Under the New Regime of the Oceans, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 513 (1984).
48 See, e.g., Miles, et al., An Assessment of Impact of Proposed Changes in the Law of the Sea on Regional
Fishery Commission on FAO Technical Assistance Programs in Fisheries and on FAO Committee on Fisheries and
Department of Fisheries, FAO, Doc. COFI:c/4/70 Inf. Feb. 3, 1976.
49 This summary is based on E. MILES, supra note 44, at chap. 3.
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Reluctantly, Japan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea) responded in kind by likewise extending theirjurisdictions
in 1977. Neither China nor the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was
then prepared to make like declarations, both facing other boundary de-
limitation problems and territorial conflicts with several adjacent and op-
posite coastal States.The continuing expansion of fishing activities provoked defensive
relations on the part of coastal States hard pressed by domestic outcry to
protect national fishermen and resources from competition of larger and
often more sophisticated fishing fleets of the Soviet Union or Japan or
even Korea. Domestic pressures heightened beyond constraint. The
United States and Canada had to resort to measures of effective control
over foreign fishing fleets, providing better conservation and developing
national harvesting and processing capabilities. Since the U.S. zones
were of considerable significance to Japan and the Republic of Korea, as
traditional fishing nations in the areas, both countries faced serious and
imminent threats of sudden dislocation of their fisheries. 50  These
problems were multiplied and further complicated by the establishment
of Soviet zones in the North Pacific. 51 Although the Pacific was not truly
a primary Soviet concern, the decision was in fact prompted by develop-
ments in other areas, namely, the Atlantic. But once extended, jurisdic-
tion is comprehensive and of general application, resulting in greater
dislocation for Japan and total exclusion for South Korean fleets from
the Soviet zones. The North Koreans benefited from this competition
from their counterparts in the Soviet zone. A series of arrangements and
accommodations were concluded after frequent and prolonged negotia-
tions between the fishing and coastal nations concerned.
B. The Magnuson Act, 1976: a Historic Milestone
Domestic pressure and ardent desires to preserve and protect vital
national interests of the coastal State induced the United States to yield
to the irresistible temptation of proclaiming the U.S. Fishery Conserva-
tion Zone (FCZ) of 200 miles off U.S. coastlines. The Act, to be known as
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
(Magnuson Act),52 was passed by Congress, establishing the U.S. Fishery
Conservation Zone and extending exclusive management authority of
the United States over all stocks, all anadromous species spawning in the
fresh and estuarine waters of the United States, and all living resources
of the U.S. continental shelf. It is worthy of notice that highly migratory
species such as tuna are specifically omitted from inclusion under U.S.
management. 53 The Act authorized the U.S. government to negotiate
50 For instance, Japan's yearly catch in the 200-mile zones of U.S.S.R., Canada and the U.S.
amounted to 6 mt. The prospect of an abrupt curtailment of 607 of the annual catch required
considerable maneuvers and tactics to achieve speedy readjustments within the time constraint.
51 See, e.g., Miles, The Evolution of Fisheries Policy and Regional Commissions in the North Pacfic Under
the Impact of Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction, in EssAYs IN MEMORY OF JEAN CARROZ 139 (1987).
52 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
53 This distinct omission was to have significant implication in subsequent conflicts with the
South Pacific island States discussed in Section IV, infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
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treaties Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFA) with gov-
ernments of other countries to award foreign flags access to fishing
grounds within the FCZ, or since the Reagan Proclamation of 1983 the
U.S. EEZ, under national jurisdiction of the United States. The
Magnuson Act came into effect on March 1, 1977. Thus, from February
28, 1977, foreign vessels were prohibited from fishing within the 200
mile FCZ off the United States coasts without prior authorization from
the U.S. government.54
Indeed, authorization from the competent agency of the United
States Government is not likely to be forthcoming in the absence of a
GIFA treaty. Only fishing vessels flying the flag of a State with which the
United States government has concluded a GIFA treaty would be eligible
for an award of such access to the fertile fishing grounds of the U.S.
North Pacific (FCZ).55 The explicit purpose of any such bilateral GIFA
Treaty is the optimum utilization of the fishery stocks located within the
U.S. FCZ which are of mutual interest to both parties, who are required
under the Treaty to ensure the effective utilization and management of
the species identified. The United States government determines on a
yearly basis the total allowable catch for each specific region, and the
allocation to foreign fishing fleets or fishermen for such region on a
country-by-country basis.5 6 The allocation of catch on a country-by-
country basis cannot be determined exclusively on the consideration of
past performance or by the criterion of economic needs. After all, con-
siderations of the most favorable character cannot be based on grounds
that are totally devoid of sound political foundations. The inclination of
the U.S. Government to conclude such a GIFA treaty must initially be
guided by political considerations. Actual annual determination of the
allocation for each of the GIFA partners must also be grounded on polit-
ical expediency apart from other substantively valid qualifications.
The United States implemented a new management scheme through
regional councils established under the Magnuson Act. In the region
under consideration, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council57
54 For the legislative history of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Programs of the
United States, see Pub. L. No. 99-659, 100 Stat. 3706 (1986); S. REP. No. 67, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); H.R. REP. Nos. 165, 430, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
55 Allocation of the tonnage of harvest for a given species in a given region is based on the
nationality of the fishing vessel as forming part of the national fishing fleet of a State with which a
bilateral GIFA Treaty is applicable. Section 182 1(e) of the Magnuson Act, 1976 entrusts the power
to make the allocation to the Secretary of State. 16 U.S.C. § 1982(e) (1982).
56 For instance, for the year 1986, optimum yield (OY) for the Gulf of Alaska was set at 471,651
mt. round weight, domestic annual harvest (DAH) 430,005 mt. and allocation to Japan 15,900 mt.
For Eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands: OY 2,003,000 mt., DAH 1,401,012 mt. Allocation to
Japan: 458,439 mt., China: 4,963 mt., Poland: 8,043 mt. and Korea (South): 116,169 mt. CURRENT
FISHERIES STATIs-ncs No. 8385, supra note 21, at 96. The term "total allowable level of foreign
fishing" is defined in § 1821(d) of the Magnuson Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1982).
57 The North Pacific Fishery Management Council is responsible for the supervision of assess-
ment of the optimum yield for the North Pacific Region. This region is defined as extending from
about 30 degrees North Latitude to the Northern tip of the Bering Strait. See E. MILEs, supra note
44, at 3-4. Under § 1852 of the Magnuson Act, the North Pacifit Council is the seventh of the eight
councils. It consists of the states of Alaska, Washington and Oregon with jurisdiction over fisheries
in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and the Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska. The Council has eleven
voting members including seven appointed by the Secretary (five from Alaska and two from Wash-
ington). 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1982).
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has discharged its responsibility in supervising the calculation of the opti-
mum yield for each species. From this calculated total optimum yield or
allowable catch is subtracted the amount to be harvested by American
fishermen. Only the remainder, which must of necessity be diminishing
each year, will be considered for allocation to other coastal States with
which the United States has concluded a GIFA Treaty. The Department
of State has a decisive voice in the allocation of catches to a GIFA signa-
tory, taking into account the conditions of political relations, the satisfac-
tory degree of cooperation in research, as well as past records of fishing
pattern.58 Political tensions, undemocratic manifestations, aggressive
designs or offensive postures, disturbing or threatening international
peace and order, may result in reduction or forfeiture of such allocation
or indeed suspension or non-renewal of treaty rights. 59 The Act has
proved to be an effective means of persuasion in a positive way, and is
not unlikely to be invoked as an indication of displeasure incurred by the
United States through actions or omissions of the foreign governments
concerned, unconnected as they may truly be with the conservation and
management of the living resources under United States jurisdiction in
the North Pacific.60
C. The United States' Fishery Policy and Practical Implementations
The Magnuson Act was amended in 1980 by the American Fisheries
Promotion Act 61 to include a mandatory reduction of foreign fisheries
within the United States FCZ. This was to be implemented by gradual
phasing out which could eliminate all foreign fishing within United States
conservation zones by 1990.62 In the North Pacific region, the North Pa-
cific Fishery Management Council was determined to achieve final phas-
ing-out of all foreign fishing as soon as possible. Very high priority is
accorded to this policy. 63
The Northeast Pacific witnessed some abatement in the intensity of
conflict over issues of conservation of stocks. Coastal States in the North
58 Section 182 1(e) clearly confers this power on "[t]he Secretary of State, in cooperation with
the Secretary [of Commerce, to] make allocations to foreign nations from the total allowable level of
foreign fishing [(TALFF)] which is permitted with respect to each fishery subject to the exclusive
fishery management authority of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1982).
59 Foreign fishing allocations under the Magnuson Act can be and have been used as rewards
and as sanctions or pressures in United States relationships with other countries. The allocation to
the Soviet Union was reduced by approximately 177 from the establishment of the FCZ in 1977
until 1979 and by 887 in 1980, when President Carter banned all direct Soviet fishing in FCZ for
1981 in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. TheJapanese quotas on the other hand have
increased by 17% from 1977 to 1980. See Miles, supra note 51, at 140-58.
60 Political relations on fishery issues have improved somewhat under the Reagan Administra-
tion. The fishing ban was partially lifted in July 1984 by allocation of 110.2 mm. pounds (50,000
mt.) of fish (mostly Alaska pollack) to Soviet fishermen in the Pacific region. The Soviet Union has
agreed to provide an equal value offish and seafood to the U.S. in return. The ban remained for the
Atlantic coast. Bilger, US-Soviet Fishing Agreement: Treaty Authorizing Soviet Fishing in U.S. Waters,
MARINE POLICY, Jan. 1986, at 51-56 (1986).
61 Pub. L. No. 96-561, Title II, 94 Stat. 3287 (1980). See also D. VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD
43 (1983).
62 See H.R. Doc. No. 217, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), and the documents preceding it.
63 See, e.g., Bilger, supra note 60, at 51-56. Compare D.JOHNSON, CANADA AND THE NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1985), especially pp. 5-9, discussing fishery interests.
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Pacific, U.S., Canada, U.S.S.R., Korea, China andJapan appeared to have
developed effective control over all foreign fishing within their respective
fisheries conservation zones, which subsequently were to be identified as
their exclusive economic zones (EEZ's).
The relatively cold and frozen seas of the Gulf of Alaska and the
North Pacific knew little of United States fishing activities prior to 1976.
The two-pronged policy of "Fish and Chips," initiated in 1980 to pro-
mote the U.S. fishing industry and to encourage consumption of seafood
in the United States, has given tremendous impetus to American indus-
trial fishery production as well as distribution in the U.S. markets. This
fishing industry which was virtually non-existent or negligible in 1976
rose astronomically in value from two million dollars in 1980 to $500
million in 1986 to approximately double that figure in 1987. Thus,
within eight to ten years from 1980, the Americanization of the fishing
industry is likely to materialize in full. 64
The take-over with phase-out policy planning has been relatively
simple. As most coastal States have accepted like practices, there ap-
pears to have been general acquiescence, if not indeed consensus, on the
status of 200 miles, at least by 1977. However, conflict seems to have
intensified significantly in regard to several multifaceted problem areas
to which careful attention may now be devoted.
1. Policy-planning and Decision-making Body
Fishery management plans include the eventual takeover of the FCZ
or EEZ by the American fishing fleet and the phase-out of all foreign
fishing in the zone. In the meantime, implementation of these plans
called for determination of the optimum yield for each fishery, defined as
that amount of fish which will yield the "greatest overall benefit to the
Nation."' 65 The Secretary of Commerce and the Regional Councils are
required under the Magnuson Act to conserve stocks and to restore
64 See, e.g., Japanese allocations in the U.S. North Pacific.
TABLE 1 (in metric tons)
Years Gulf of Alaska Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Total
1977 105,000 1,063,400 1,168,400
1978 101,785 1,129,025 1,230,810
1979 118,002 1,063,585 1,181,587
1980 159,422 1,220,640 1,380,062
1981 217,439 1,181,443 1,398,882
1982 196,753 1,159,715 1,356,468
1983 142,917 1,023,339 1,166,265
1984 131,649 1,022,891 1,154,540
1985 35,668 864,332 900,000
1986 15,900 458,439 474,339
Sources: NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8380, FISHERIERS OF THE U.S., 1986, at 98 (1987)
[hereinafter CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8380]; and CURRENT FISHERY
STATISTICS No. 8385, supra note 21, at 96.
65 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(A) (1982).
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stocks depleted by foreign fishing. 66 In so doing, they are to assure a
continuity of food and recreational benefits, avoid irreversible or long-
term adverse effect, and maintain a multiplicity of options for the future.
The total allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF), which is on the de-
crease, is calculated after deducting the domestic annual harvest (DAH)
from the optimum yield (OY). The domestic annual harvest (DAH) does
not always reflect the sum-total of domestic annual processing (DAP) and
joint venture processing (JVP), although in principle DAP and JVP
roughly constitute the DAH.67
The allocation of TALFF, on the other hand, is determined by the
Secretary of State incooperation with the Secretary of Commerce.68
Therefore, there is a settled division of labor or distribution of power
among the various branches of the government in matters of policy-plan-
ning and decision-making in the implementation of Fishery Management
Plans. The most crucial aspect of this planning includes the creation of
American fishing fleets and the promotion of the U.S. fishing industry,
the "Fish and Chips" policy. The Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) are
in turn subject to existing international arrangements, such as with high
seas salmon, Pacific halibut, *U.S./Canada salmon interceptions, and
North Fur seals. Allocations are otherwise in accordance with the series
of GIFA treaties.
Inherent in the decision system of the North Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council is a two-tier structure of national and sub-national levels of
participants by agencies or instrumentalities of government. At the na-
tional level, under supervision of Congress, the participants include the
Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fishery Service
(NMFS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the" Secretary of State (foreign allocation), the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the Secretary of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard for En-
forcement of Regulation).69 The sub-national participants include the
North Pacific Fishery Management Council (with'its seat in Anchorage,
Alaska), the Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center (with its headquar-
ters in Seattle, Washington), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Alaska Board of Fisheries, Wash-
ington Department of Fisheries, and Oregon Department of Fish and
Wild Life.
in addition to the national and sub-national official levels of manage-
ment implementation, there is an interplay of competing, if not conflict-
ing, private sectors, viz., domestic fishermen, domestic processors,
domestic fast food chains, foreign fishermen, and foreign processors.
The transition is envisaged from foreign to joint ventures and hence to
final domestication or Americanization of the fishing industry from re-
search to techniques in harvesting, processing, distribution, and market-
ing. This may in turn serve to prolong if not perpetuate joint ventures
66 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982) (Findings, purposes and policy). Cf. Miles, National and International
Premises in Ocean Management, The Use of the North Pacific, 17 L. SEA INST., 477, 482 (1984).
67 See 16 U.S.C. § 182 1(d) (1982) (Total Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing (TALFF)).
68 See id. § 1821(e) (Allocation of Allowable Level).
69 For a critical opinion of the decision system, see Miles, supra note 66, 488-489.
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since export trade would seem to presuppose the cooperation of foreign
trade partners. It would be difficult to imagine how fish and fish prod-
ucts could be exported from the United States to markets in Japan, South
Korea, or other parts of Asia without the cooperation of the governments
of the importing States.
The United States is a pluralistic society. The American people are
inventive and pragmatic. The complex composition of the different tiers
of administration of fishery management is not untypical of a creative
body from which may flow great decisions. It has not been simple to
achieve harmony and agreed priorities on all questions with differing im-
plications. Other problem areas also provide interesting challenges.
2. Joint Ventures as a Means to Promote Domestic Fishing Industry
In a number of instances, joint ventures involving harvesting as well
as processing technologies are included as explicit or implicit conditions
for access to the Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) in the North Pacific.
Transfer of technology is sought to enable U.S. fishermen to learn not
only the techniques of trawling but also to acquire the ability to locate
the species to be harvested. Joint ventures constitute the most reassur-
ing means to promote the skills of American fishermen in the search for
valuable species and in their optimum exploitation. The American fish-
ing industry is further promoted by transfer of processing technology,
canning, and preserving in cold storage for distribution. Japanese part-
ners in the joint ventures have sometimes complained that the require-
ment ofjoint ventures invariably implies U.S. participation in a relatively
easier part of the operation. Japanese partners are to find with precision
the location and movements of the schools of fish or bowls of shrimps so
as to enable trawling or swooping nets. The catch may be sold over the
ship side at higher prices than landing, as the landing charges need not
be paid or transport costs defrayed for the purchase of the catch fresh
from the sea where they have been spotted. 70
Joint ventures in harvesting have contributed to the economy of the
region, not only in securing additional revenue for State and income for
the fishermen, but particularly in opening opportunities for crab vessels
which would otherwise have been dormant and unemployed since the
collapse of crab fisheries in 1982. The variety of species harvested in-
clude sable fish, white fish, pollack, Pacific cod, flounder, Pacific hake,
Atka mackerel, rockfish, squid, Pacific whiting, Pacific ocean perch and
others.7'
Joint ventures in processing have equally supported the developing
economy of the region by guaranteeing both increased income and
steady employment. However, in this connection another internal con-
flict appears to have arisen between the American off-shore processors
who have resorted to Soviet or Japanese factory ships, thus saving time
and costs of landing, and the traditional land-based processors who are
70 These shortcuts constitute time-saving devices and cost-cutting procedures for U.S. partners
in the joint ventures.
71 See CURRENT FISHERY STATISTIcs No. 8385, supra note 21, at 96, 98-99.
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confronted with problems of long-term decline as the result of restruc-
turing of the fishing industry.72 Government intervention and protection
have been constantly sought. Indeed,joint ventures, in their actual oper-
ation, have raised considerable controversies, as the catch delivered
over-the-side to a foreign factory ship would not be considered as for-
eign fishing. The United States land-based processors were able to in-
clude an amendment to the Magnuson Act in 1978, 73 which in effect
disallowed such over-the-side deliveries unless it was established that the
United States land-based processors either did not have the capacity or
would not utilize such capacity to process the amount and species of fish
to be processed at sea. This "Processor Preference Amendment" serves
to readjust the ranking of double priorities for allocating the living re-
sources in the U.S. zone. Harvesting and processing by U.S. industry
takes top priority. Harvesting by the United States combined with for-
eign processing receives second priority. Harvesting and processing by
foreign industries will be accorded lowest priority.
The conflict did not end there. Further controversies arose between
U.S. fishermen harvesting the same stock, but serving different markets.
Thus, area separation of fleets and mesh size regulations had to be im-
plemented. 74 The possibility of reflagging or transfer of foreign fish-
processing vessels to the U.S. flag was indeed attractive to off-shore
processors with foreign crews, but caused appropriate alarm to Alaskan
land-based processors and organized labor. The loophole in United
States law regarding nationality of vessels may have to be maintained in
view of the crisis in another area of the world, 75 but for the U.S. fishing
industry to grow, the requirement of U.S. crews would afford tolerable
compromise.
Joint ventures in the private sector, both for harvesting and process-
ing, have proved successful after weathering seasonal storms to promote
the United States fishing industry to replace, if not to supplant, foreign
enterprises operating within the U.S. fishery conservation zones. As a
problem area, joint ventures will need to grow from harvesting to
processing and thence to marketing as an ultimate target, which requires
meticulous care and patience in policy planning and implementation.
The challenges continue as new conflicts and problems emerge to defy
new endeavors and resolute perseverance.
3. Regulation of Fishery Practices
To implement the Magnuson Act, especially the "Fish and Chips"
policy since 1980, fishery practices within the United States Fishery Con-
servation Zone (FCZ) in the North Pacific need to be closely watched.
72 See, e.g., Miles, supr z note 51, at 146-48.
73 See, e.g., Gordon & Gutting,Jr., The Coastal Fishing Industry and the EEZ, OCEANUS, Winter 1984-
85, at 36-37.
74 See remarks made by Bart Eaton, fisherman and director of Trident Seafoods Corp., at a semi-
nar on U.S./Japan Friendship Society of Seattle and the Institute of Marine Studies, University of
Washington. Cf E.L. Miles, supra, note 51, at 146 n.9.
75 For instance, the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988.
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They require rational and sound regulation in order to achieve optimum
results in every imaginable respect.
Minimum practical measures to regulate fishing by foreign nationals
and vessels within the U.S. FCZ comprise the enlisting of cooperation on
the part of the foreign governments concerned. Necessary measures
must be taken by the participating foreign governments to ensure that
their nationals and vessels refrain from harassing, hunting, capturing or
killing or attempting to harass, hunt, capture or kill, any marine mam-
mals within the U.S. FCZ except as may be otherwise provided by appli-
cable international agreement respecting marine mammals. 76 They shall
also refrain from fishing for living resources over which the United States
exercises fishery management authority, except as authorized pursuant
to agreement with the United States. Foreign vessels so authorized shall
comply with the provisions of the permits issued pursuant to the applica-
ble laws of the United States. In any event, the total allocation assigned
to the fishing fleet of a participating government must not be exceeded
for any fishery.77 Application for a permit for each foreign fishing vessel
is prepared and processed according to regulations. Payment of reason-
able fees for such permits may be required.78
Each foreign vessel is required to display the authorizing permit
prominently. Designated U.S. observers are permitted on board any
such fishing vessel upon request and shall be treated as ship's officers
while aboard such vessel. The United States government is entitled to
reimbursement for the costs incurred in using observers. 79 Foreign fish-
ing vessels shall "allow and assist the boarding and inspection" of such
vessels by any duly authorized enforcement official of the U.S. and shall
"cooperate in such enforcement actions."80 Joint Fisheries Claims
Boards have been established to consider claims resulting from damage
to fishing vessel, gear or catch caused by fishing vessels of another
party. 81
Jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters is provided by the
Magnuson Act and accepted in bilateral agreements concluded with for-
eign governments. Section 1857 provides that it is unlawful for any per-
son, among other things, to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede,
intimidate or interfere with any such authorized officer of the United
States in the conduct of any search or inspection.82 In case of enforce-
ment action undertaken by the United States government, the economic
loss incurred by the vessel and crew because of the loss of fishing time
76 See, e.g., Article VI of the Agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concerning Fisheries
off the Coasts of the U.S., Nov. 26, 1976 [hereinafter U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement of Nov. 26, 19761; H.R.
Doc. No. 217, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
77 See id., art. IV.
78 See id., art. V.
79 See id., art. VII(3).
80 See id., art. VIII(l).
81 See, e.g., the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement relating to the Consideration of Claims Resulting from
Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures to Prevent Fishing Conflicts, signed in Moscow,
February 21, 1973 (referred to in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, supra note 76, art.
VIII(3)).
82 See 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(E) (1982).
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shall be minimized through "prompt release of the vessel and crew upon
the posting of reasonable bond or other security."83 While this provision
appears to conform to the language of Article 73 of the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea 1982,84 Article 73 also provides that "penalties for
violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the [EEZ] may not include
imprisonment... or any other form of corporal punishment."85 Thus,
the exercise of enforcement measures pursuant to regulations in force in
the EEZ or FCZ, especially in penal sanctions, could run counter to the
letter and spirit of the U.N. Convention and customary rules of the Sea.8 6
The jurisdiction of the flag State in penal matters appears to have been
generally recognized as predominant if not indeed exclusive.8 7 This is
another problem area where controversies and conflicts could arise be-
tween the United States Government and foreign flag State.8 The solu-
tion may be found in observance of general rules of international law or
maritime law, rather than insistence on fishery management regulation
by the coastal State.89 A compromise formula may be opportune in the
form of a mixed claim commission or joint claim board, established by
bilateral agreements.
Another problem area for enforcement of management and conser-
vation regulations lies in the implementation of fact-finding, data-collect-
ing, biostatistical information gathering, and survey or monitoring of
stocks and catches in order to determine the optimum yield (allowable
catch), the capacity of domestic harvesting, and the level of allocation to
foreign harvesting. Boarding and physical inspection of foreign fishing
vessels constitute a potential source of tension. It is difficult to verify
compliance with the requirements of submission of periodic reports and.
records of catches for each of the species specified, such as Pacific hake,
Pacific Ocean perch, rockfishes, sable fish, Dover sole, flounders, ancho-
vies, herrings and any other species taken in excess of 1,000 mt. It is also
difficult to verify compliance with catch data reporting requirements for
the Bering Sea and Aleutian Trawl Fishery, covering yellowfin sole, rock
sole, arrow-tooth flounder, Greenland turbot, Pacific cod and Walleye
pollock, and for Gulf of Alaska Trawl Fisheries. The U.S. Coast Guard is
developing plans to place devices on board foreign vessels authorized to
fish in United States FCZ to enable enforcement cutters or aircraft to
83 See art. IX(2), U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, supra note 76.
84 See art. 73, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, at 26.
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., id, art. 27 (criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship), art. 97 (penal jurisdiction in
matters of collision or any other incident of navigation), and art. 73(3)(4), at 9, 33 and 26,
respectively.
87 See, e.g., the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 11, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
88 A dispute has arisen respecting a South Korean fishing vessel boarded by a U.S. officer of
inspection, who for personal reasons was assaulted by a member of the Korean crew. The arrest and
prosecution took place in the U.S. in accordance with U.S. regulation. The Korean government
would have preferred to exercise penal jurisdiction through a Korean Court of Law in conformity
with maritime law for offenses committed on the high sea on board a Korean vessel. Admittedly,
there could be concurrent criminal jurisdiction as the victim of the assault was a U.S. official while in
the performance of his functions.
89 General international law of the sea should take precedence over special enforcement meas-
ures when there could be concurrence of competingjurisdiction. The flag State is predominant. See
art. 97(1), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, at 982, and earlier conventions.
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identify and ascertain the position of authorized vessels within United
States jurisdiction.90
4. Greater Access to Foreign Markets for United States Fish Products
To carry out the "Fish and Chips" policy to its logical conclusion,
the promotion of United States fishing industry must necessarily include
a further final step of securing greater access of U.S. catches and fish
products to the markets of the countries whose fishing vessels and na-
tionals continue to receive permits to fish in U.S. FCZ. Trade barriers
should continue to be lowered in favor of U.S. based or U.S. processed
fish products, through trade liberalization and marketing assistance.
There is an inevitable connection between access to FCZ and access to
markets, especially in the effort to offset in some measure the trade im-
balance with countries like Japan. For several years Japan has continued
to maintain a favorable balance of trade vis-a-vis the United States even
in regard to mutual trade in fish products, owing to the open structure of
U.S. markets. The link between trade and access to the U.S. zone is more
pronounced in the U.S.-Japanese relations than in regard to access to the
U.S. zone by other foreign fishing vessels. The impact of linkage be-
tween access to fishing zones and access to markets has been negligible
in countries such as the U.S.S.R., with which joint ventures have had no
opportunity to take root. With Japan, the impact is clearly noticeable.
Since 1979, Japan has imported more fish products in quantity and value
from the United States, and the United States is an important trade part-
ner of Japan in both exports and imports. 91 Once established, this
healthy trade practice, based on mutuality of benefits and complementar-
ity of different components in the joint ventures, will grow.
D. Bilateral Fisheries Relations in the North Pacific
1. Soviet-United States Fisheries Relationship
Soviet fishing vessels had been harvesting in the off-shore areas
close to the U.S. coasts in the North Pacific long before the negotiations
on the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Since the 1960's, the
United States and the Soviet governments have signed bilateral agree-
ments permitting Soviet access to fishing grounds in U.S. waters. During
the 1970's, the issue of Soviet fishing fleets in U.S. waters became more
noticeable as interests in promoting the U.S. fishing industry began to
take shape, culminating in the adoption of the Magnuson Act in 1976.
The U.S. "Fish and Chips" policy incorporated in the Amendment of
1980,92 called for total abolition of foreign fishing within a decade.
In 1977, the U.S.S.R. caught some 844 million pounds live weight of
fish in the U.S. FCZ, or approximately 23% of the total foreign alloca-
90 See Annexes II and III, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement of November 26, 1976, supra note 76, at
11018.
91 See, e.g., Ginsberg & Naska,Japan "s Fisheries, 193 U.S. EMBASSY CERP REPORT, TOKYO, apps. 8,
9 and 11.
92 Pub. L. No. 96-561, Title II, 94 Stat. 3287 (1980); see also D. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 61, at
43.
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tions. The Soviet allocations have been reduced each year. Table 293
shows a comparison of actual catch and allocation by year and by country
which indicates substantial reduction of Soviet allocations and catch
down to zero level in 1981, during which there was a total ban on direct
Soviet fishing as a countermeasure to the Soviet activities in Afghani-
stan.94 In 1984, the ban was temporily lifted for the Pacific region. An
allocation of approximately 50,000 mt. of fish, mainly Alaskan pollack,
was made to Soviet fishermen in the Pacific region. The Soviet-U.S.
agreement concerning fisheries off the U.S. coasts was renewed from
year to year, the last one expiring on December 31, 1985.95 The chapter
on U.S.-Soviet fishery relations was brought to a close with the total ex-
clusion of Soviet fishing fleets from U.S. FCZ. In a strange way, the
agreement may be viewed as the only constructive non-strategic trade
relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in recent years.
2. Japanese-U.S. Fisheries Relationship
In a way healthier, but not unlike the Soviet-U.S. fisheries relation-
ship, the Japanese-U.S. cooperation in fisheries has succeeded in imple-
menting almost in full the policy objectives set in the Magnuson Act and
93
TABLE 2: Catches and Allocations by Comity in the U.S. FCZ 1977-81 (in
millions of pounds live weight).
Actual Catches
Country 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Total 8,599 5,281 5,408 5,591 5,968
U.S.A. 4,853 1,414 1,771 2,003 2,320
Foreign 3,747 3,867 3,637 3,588 3,648
U.S.S.R. 844 823 628 128 xxxx
Japan 2,487 2,610 2,458 2,602 2,559
Canada 69 91 58 65 66
U.K. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Allocation
Country 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981Ttlxxxx xxx xxxx xxx' xxxx
U.S.A. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
Foreign xxxx xxxx 4,634 4,799 4,638
U.S.S.R. 1,433 1,286 1,191 169 xxxx
Japan 2,649 2,757 2,657 3,095 3,140
Canada 49 xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
U.K. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Source and Notes: U.S. DEvr. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
1977-83. Numbers are rounded to the nearest million. Total foreign catches
include countries not shown separately. Principle species caught by the U.S.S.R.
include hake, pollock, whiting and flounder; by Japan include pollock, founder
and Pacific cod; by Canada include scallops, Antarctic cod and haddock.
94 During the ban, Soviet fishermen were allowed to purchase U.S. caught fish over-the-side
through the joint venture Marine Resources Co. of Seattle, Washington. U.S. fish was processed by
Soviet factQry ships in mid-ocean. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1981, at D4.
95 See Governing International Fishery Agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union, Message from the President of the United States, (transmitting notification of the proposed
extension of the governing international fishery agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union until December 31, 1985, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 203(a)), H. R. Doc. 217, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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the "Fish and Chips" policy outlined in the 1980 amendment. Every
inch of the way is characterized by extreme care on both sides coupled
with understanding and sympathetic, if not generous, considerations dis-
played by the United States government. As has been apparent from Ta-
bles 1 and 2,96 Japanese quotas were maintained over several years even
with increases in 1980 and 1981 due to the absence of allocation to the
Soviet fishermen following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Sub-
sequent allocations were shared by other meriting foreign partners in
fishery relations such as South Korea and China. As shown in Table 3,9 7
even Poland is a beneficiary of United States allocation for waters off
Washington, Oregon, and California, as well as the Eastern Bering Sea
and Aleutian Islands as late as 1986. TheJapanese quotas were kept in-
tact for several years between 1977 and 1984. It was not until 1985 and
1986 that allocations forJapan were drastically reduced from the average
of 1.2 mts. (1977-1984) to 0.806 mt. in 1985 and 0.457 mt. in 1986.
There was a reduction of one third in 1985 and nearly one half in 1986.98
The downward trend is likely to continue with a steady decrease of 40%
which may be sustained in the foreseeable future. 99
In 1976, total Japanese catch was 9.6 mt., of which 5.5 mt. were
within Japan's 200-mile zone. 4.7 mt. were within 200-mile zones of
other coastal States. Of the Japanese foreign catch, 1.4 mt. were from
the U.S. zone, 1.4 mt. from the Soviet zone, 0.6 mt. from China and Ko-
rea 200-mile zones and 0.3 mt. in the high seas. Thus, 40% of the Japa-
nese catch in 1975 was from U.S. and Soviet 200-mile zones. But Japan
was better able to replace the lost fishing grounds resulting from the ex-
tended maritime jurisdiction by other coastal States by increasing the
catch and exploiting new species such as sardines within her own coastal
waters. With patience in negotiation for continuing U.S. and Soviet allo-
cations and optimum utilization of fisheries and fish culture, Japan has
been able to maintain and even increase the volume and value of her
commercial catch world wide throughout the critical period of impact of
extended jurisdiction by coastal States, notably the U.S., Canada and
U.S.S.R. 100 As shown in Table 4,101 Japan remained at the top of the list
of commercial catches of selected countries even after 1975, followed
closely by the U.S.S.R. and trailed in the distance by the U.S.A.
96 See TABLE 1, supra note 64, and TABLE 2, supra note 93.
97
TABLE 3: Foreign Fishing Allocations - by Country and Region for 1986 (in metric
tons)
Washington, Oregon Gulf of Eastern
California, Alaska Bering Sea Alaska Total
Japan 0 15,900 458,439 474,339
China 0 0 4,963 4,963
Poland 70,000 0 8,043 78,043
South Korea 0 0 116,169 116,169
Source: CURRENT FISHING STATIsncs No. 8385, supra note 21 at 96.
98 See TABLE 1, supra note 64.
99 There is no indication of upward trend.
100 See, e.g., Statement by a Japanese participant at the 21st Annual Conference of the Law of the
Sea Institute (Aug. 4-7, 1987).
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In the ten years since the United States extended its jurisdiction over
fisheries, it has been observed that foreign fishing in the U.S. FCZ had
declined by 67%.102 With the greater share of fish caught in the U.S.
zone being taken by American fishermen and harvesters, competition
among domestic interests has grown. Every advantage counts, and if that
advantage is affected by foreign fishermen or processors, controversy
over foreign fishing flares up again. As far as Japan is concerned, it is a
different story altogether. It is one of survival with flying colors but with
patience and bitter experience, especially in the context of the U.S. FCZ
and the Soviet EEZ. With the U.S.S.R., Japan has to trade her access to
the Soviet zone with Soviet access to the.Japanese zone on an equal or
equivalent footing. Table 5 indicates total catch and allocation for Japan
in the Soviet zone and for the U.S.S.R. in the Japanese zone in 1975-
101
TABLE 4: Commerial Catch of Selected Countries 1970-1980 (in billions of
pounds live weight)
Country 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
Total 153.4 144.6 145.7 155.4 154.1
Japan 20.5 22.5 23.7 23.8 23.2
U.S.S.R. 26.0 17.1 19.0 20.4 21.9
U.S.A. 6.1 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.0
Canada 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3
U.K. 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.2 1.1
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Total 164.1 159.0 155.5 157.1 159.2
Japan 23.5 23.7 22.5 21.9 23.3
U.S.S.R. 22.3 20.6 19.7 20.1 20.8
U.S.A. 7.0 6.8 7.5 7.7 8.0
Canada 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.1 2.9
U.K. 1.1 2.2 1.2 1.9 0.9
Source: U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1977-
1983
102 See, e.g., Remarks by Ambassador Edward Wolfe, Jr., Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Uni-
versity of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA. (Oct. 25, 1986).
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1986.103 This bears testimony to the efforts of both parties to maintain a
healthy balance.
The only clear-cut winner since the extensions of coastal State juris-
diction in the North Pacific in 1977 is undoubtedly the U.S.A.. The So-
viet Union cannot be said to be a loser, as her Northwest Pacific catch has
increased by 25 to 28 percent since 1976. This region has been the most
significant region for United States domestic catch with room to maneu-
ver in terms of allocations based on joint ventures and greater access to
markets in Japan and other Asian countries. Canadian interests in the
Pacific are relatively small. While the major losers are Japan, South Ko-
rea' 0 4 and Thailand, Japan has recovered her loss through increased pro-
duction from her off-shore fishery as well as from the production of
hatchery reared chum salmon, which appear to represent a shift in rela-
tion to the declining salmon catch by Japanese high seas fleets. The
United States government sees some advantage in continuing allocations
for Japanese fishermen in return for continuing joint ventures and
widening built-in access to Japanese markets. Thus, complete phase-out
103
TABLE 5: Total Catch and Allocation for Japan in the Soviet Zone and for
the U.S.S.R. in the Japanese Zone 1975-86 (in metric tons)
Japanese catch/allocation Soviet catch/allocation
Year in Japanese zone in Soviet zone
1975 914,000 300-400,000
1976 N/A 365,000
1977 700,800 458,850
1978 750,000 650,000
1979 750,000 650,000
1980 750,000 650,000
1981 750,000 650,000
1982 750,000 650,000
1983 N/A N/A
1984 700,000 640,000
1985 600,000 600,000
Sources and Notes: The figures for 1975 show the reported and estimated
catches for the areas later covered by extended jurisdiction. Figures for 1975-
78, E. MILES, supra note 44, at 188-189, Tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.12, 6.13; Figures for
1979-83, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NORA/NMFS, Foreign Fishery
Information Release No. 83-2,Jan. 25, 1983; for 1984, FFI Release No. 85-5,
March 21, 1985; and for 1985, FFI Release No. 86-0, March 8, 1986.
104
TABLE 6. South Korean Allocation 1977-1986 (in metric tons)
Year Gulf of Alaska Eastern Bering Sea Total Alaska
1977 38,100 43,090 81,190
1978 43,698 69,755 113,453
1979 43,051 106,974 150,025
1980 52,105 190,340 242,445
1981 88,387 180,149 268,536
1982 96,031 210,969 307,000
1983 59,518 265,172 324,690
1984 65,597 264,160 329,757
1985 10,347 239,872 250,219
1986 0 116,169 116,169
Sources: CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8380 supra. note 64, at 98, and
CURRENT FISHERY STATISTICS No. 8385, supra note 21, at 96.
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of foreign fishing under the "Fish and Chips" policy will best be delayed
at least in the few years ahead.
IV. Cooperation Between the United States and Island Nations in the
South-West Pacific
To shift the scene from the North to the South or Southwest Pacific
is to transform the position of the United States from the perspective of a
coastal State, entitled to extend maritime jurisdiction to cover fishery
conservation and management in the 200-mile zone, to that of a distant-
water fishing nation, whose interest is to maintain the capacity and ability
to fish freely in the high seas and as liberally as possible in the waters of
other coastal States. In the North Pacific region, which is the most signif-
icant region of the fishery world, the United States has emerged as the
uncontested winner, the unchallenged champion with increasing wins
and accruing interests. It remains to be seen how in the converse situa-
tion, the United States in the Southwest Pacific region could ultimately
emerge also as salvor of its own national interests as well as reliable
friend, good neighbor and active partner of the South Pacific Island
States in progress and mutual cooperation.
That every nation, large or small, every coastal State, rich or poor,
has the duty to cooperate with one another, 0 5 no one denies. Yet when
it comes to actual implementation of this lofty principle, both within and
beyond the EEZ's, a State may be overly influenced by its own immediate
self-interests, at the expense of its more consistent long-term interest in
the peace, progress and stability of the entire region. Clearly, the United
States is a superpower particularly vis-a-vis the sixteen member nations
of the Pacific Forum. The United States could impose its views in this
region, but such an autocratic attitude would be unbecoming of a great
nation such as the U.S.A.. Differences and conflicts of views or interests
should be resolved with give and take, such that all parties benefit from a
negotiated solution to the conflicting interests. The lessons of history
have taught us the futility of a dictated solution whereby one State im-
poses its will as the rule of law or even international law.
The maximum interests that any State could claim for itself in every
possible situation have been claimed by the United States. For the North
Pacific region, as coastal State, the United States has won a clear victory
and is hailed as a generous victorious power, without making the other
States shameful losers without honor and dignity. The United States had
chosen to extend its jurisdiction in the North Pacific in 1976 by the adop-
tion of the Magnuson Act. Having done so, it had rightly accepted simi-
lar claims of extension by other coastal States in the same region,
including Canada, the U.S.S.R. and Japan. Having set this pattern, the
United States cannot be heard to propound a different principle for a
different region of the Pacific ocean. In this regard, the United States has
been consistent in exempting "migratory species" from the exercise of
U.S. fishery management and conservation authority.
105 See in particular U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, supra note 1, art. 64, at 22 (Highly
migratory species).
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A. The Controversial Issue of Sovereignty
The point at issue has been presented, rightly or wrongly, as the
controversy regarding sovereignty or lack thereof over the migratory
species which have found their way into the EEZ's or the 200-mile limits
of a coastal State. It has been suggested that, quite consistently with the
Magnuson Act establishing the Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) of 200-
miles measured from U.S. coastlines, the United States has not claimed
sovereignty or any title over highly migratory species, notably tuna,
which roam about in the U.S. 200-mile zone. By the same token, it has
been argued that no other coastal State can adopt any view different from
that adopted by the United States with regard to sovereignty over highly
migratory species within their EEZ's. It follows that the fishing vessels of
any foreign States, not excluding the United States, could fish for highly
migratory species within the 200-mile EEZ of any given coastal State. By
not claiming or by disclaiming U.S. sovereignty over highly migratory
species within the U.S. EEZ, it is not inconsistent for the U.S. govern-
ment to oppose the claim of sovereignty made by other nations over
highly migratory species within their respective EEZ.
But is sovereignty really at issue in this connection? Highly migra-
tory species do not recognize the sovereignty of any nation whose EEZ
they happen to pass through, nor indeed do they feel that any allegiance
is owed on their part for any pleasure of passage through a national EEZ.
Is that not equally true of any other species that happen to transgress
maritime boundaries? Halibut or salmon swimming across the EEZ of
one coastal State to another neither change their allegiance nor owner-
ship. Nor can any change in status be attributable to them for leaving or
entering the high seas to and from the EEZ of any coastal State.' 0 6 There
is an apparent mistaken identity as to the legal point at issue.
If the new law of the sea permits the exercise of regulatory control
over living and non-living resources within the 200-mile EEZ of a coastal
State, it is open to each coastal State to exercise or not to exercise any
control in any way it deems appropriate. If the United States govern-
ment did not choose to regulate the highly migratory species within her
EEZ, it is entitled so to refrain from any regulation. Does this mean,
however, that every other coastal State, regardless of her interests, must
be bound to follow the example, view, leadership or whatever path is
taken by the U.S.A.? Clearly it is lawful for the U.S. government to claim
sovereignty or to denounce sovereign rights over migratory species
within its own EEZ. But this does not authorize the U.S. government to
oppose a different position, adopted by other coastal States, that is within
the permissible limits of the new ocean law.
Indeed, Article 64 of the 1982 Convention requires the coastal State
and other State (U.S. not excluded) whose nationals fish in the region for
highly migratory species to "cooperate directly or through appropriate
international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and pro-
106 See, e.g., Tsamenyi, The South Pacific States, the U.S.A. and Sovereignty over Highly Migratory Species,
MARINE POLICY, Jan. 1986, at 29.
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moting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout
the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone."' 10 7
The question at issue therefore is not whether the coastal State has
sovereignty over highly migratory species within its EEZ. The question
at hand is whether the U.S. fishermen could penetrate the EEZ of an-
other coastal State and with impunity proceed to harvest living resources
in that zone in violation and utter disregard of the regulations adopted
by that coastal State. The issue to be resolved is whether the United
States government should observe the fishery conservation and manage-
ment regimes set up by other coastal States for fishing within their re-
spective EEZs, these regimes operating within the permissible limits of
the new ocean law.
B. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (F.F.A.)
Article 64 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea envisages
the establishment of international organizations in every region to pro-
mote cooperation among the coastal State and other State whose nation-
als harvest highly migratory species in the region. In 1976 at the Seventh
South Pacific Forum Meeting, the island State of South and Southwest
Pacific decided to set up the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(F.F.A.) to foster regional cooperation in this connection, to conserve
marine resources, and to undertake joint actions in matters of surveil-
lance and policy. l08 The convention establishing the agency was con-
cluded in July, 1979 at the Eighth South Pacific Forum Meeting in Suva,
Fiji. Australia and New Zealand contribute two-thirds of the F.F.A.'s
budget; the remaining one-third is shared equally among the other South
Pacific island member nations.10 9
The agency is governed by the Forum Fisheries Committee which
functions to promote ifntra-regional coordination and cooperation, the
harmonization of fisheries management policies, relations with distant-
water fishing countries, such as the U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, Korea and
Thailand, surveillance and enforcement, onshore fish processing and
marketing, and mutual access to the 200-mile zones of other parties. 110
Geographically, the EEZ of the F.F.A. covers an enormous expanse
of ocean space, with the necessary financial burden of managing the re-
sources in these zones of extended jurisdiction. Practically all South Pa-
cific States have adopted 200-mile exclusive fisheries zones, if not the
EEZ. Thus, more than six million square nautical miles of the tropical
Pacific Ocean fall directly under the national and collective jurisdiction of
members of the F.F.A. The sea-land ratio for the members of the F.F.A.
107 See, e.g, Reagan Proclamation of March 10, 1983, supra note 4; Healey, supra note 23, at 84-85.
108 The current members of the South Pacific Forum are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Kingdom of Tonga, Tavalu, Vanatu, and Western Samoa (Sixteen in all).
109 See, e.g., A. Lawrent, Institution for Political Cooperation in the South Pacific: The South
Pacific Forum, 1971-1979, at 144 (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Papua, New Guinea, 1980).
110 See art. 5, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, 1979, FAO Fisheries Rep. No.
293, 201-294 (1983), supra note 30; van Dyke & Heftel, Tuna Management in the Pacific: An Analysis of
the South Pacfic Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAW. L. REv. 6 (1981). ,
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is several thousands to one. I ' To implement the optimum utilization of
the newly acquired EEZ resources, the zones have to be protected against
unauthorized foreign fishing. Policing such a large area is expensive.
Furthermore, the need for regional cooperation is dictated by the highly
migratory nature of the stocks. The species need to be adequately man-
aged to avoid over-exploitation. This regional organization is indeed in
conformity with the recommendation inherent in Article 64 of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
C. Cooperation from Distant- Waters Fishing Nations
The Pacific island States appear ever ready and willing to accept the
cooperation of out-of-region States, including distant-water fishing na-
tions, whose national economies have been largely strengthened by the
extended maritime jurisdiction. The land area of the Pacific Island re-
gion (excluding Papua New Guinea) is 87,801 square kilometers. As
seen in Table 7,112 total EEZ marine areas of 27,449,000 square kilome-
ters have been attached to these island States. Without the EEZ, these
111 See sketch map in Annex 2, infra.
112 The 22 countries and territories shown in Table 7 have a combined land area of approxi-
mately 550,000 square kilometers of which one country, Papua New Guinea, accounts for 84%
(462,243 km2). The 200 nautical mile EEZ and Fishery Zones declared under the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea have effectively extended their marine resource jurisdiction to a total area
greater than 30 million km2.
TABLE 7: Pacific Island Countries and Territories
Country/Territory
American Samoa
Cook Islands
Federated States of
Micronesia
Fiji
French Polynesia
Guam
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Nauru
New Caledonia
Niue
Northern Mariana Is.
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Pitcairn Island
Solomon Islands
Tokelau
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Wallis & Funtuna
Western Samoa
Pacific Islands region
Pacific Islands region
(excluding Papua
New Guinea)
Land Area
(km2)
197
240
701
18,272
3,265
541
690
181
21
19,103
259
496
462,243
100
27,556
10
699
26
11,880
225
2,935
550,044
Status of 200
Mile Zone
Declared
Economic
Economic
Fishing
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Fishing
Fishing
Economic
Economic
Fishing/Economic
Fishing
Fishing/Economic
Fishing
Fishing/Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
87,801
Year
1977
1977
1979
1981
1978
1977
1983
1979
1978
1978
1978
1978/1983
1979
1978
1980
1978
1977
1984
1978
1978
1977
1980 EEZ
Area (1000
km2)
390
1,830
2,987
1,290
5,030
218
3,550
2,131
320
1,740
390
1,823
629
3,120
800
1,340
290
700
900
680
300
120
30,569
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island nations are not viable economically. Their livelihoods depend on
income from the resources within 'the 200-mile zone, and their ability
individually as well as collectively to prevent intrusion and unauthorized
exploitation by out-of-region distant-water fishing nations.
This Southwest Pacific region is among the world's richest fishing
grounds for tuna. In 1984, for instance, an estimated 650,000 mt. of
tuna of all species were harvested, which accounted for one quarter of
the total world production. In 1985, the total world skip-jack tuna catch
was about 700,000 mt, of which well over 400,000 mt. were harvested by
distant-water fishing nations. This catch is considered small compared to
the region's sustainable yield of skip-jack tuna. In Fiji, for instance, the
processing plant at Levuka has the capacity to process more than double
the 4,000 to 6,000 mt. of annual catch from Fiji-based fishing operations.
Fiji's EEZ could easily sustain an annual tuna harvest of 30,000 mt.
There are thus immense'opportunities and scope for expansion of com-
mercial exploitation of tuna resources in the region without the danger
of depletion. Ninety percent of the tuna catch in the region is currently
being taken by distant-water fishing nations from outside the region.
The remaining 10% -is being harvested by locally based fishing fleets.
Only 3% of the catch is being processed within the region, with 97%
being processed elsewhere.
In 1984, 598,720 mt. of tuna, out of the 650,000 mt. total catch,
were taken by distant-water tuna fleets licensed to operate within the re-
gion. The foreign catch was estimated at $662.7 million as against the
access fees of $15 million a year, or less than 3% of the market value. A
collective approach by the F.F.A. is yielding more fruitful results.
In the South Pacific, F.F.A. countries are prepared to cooperate with
every friendly distant-water fishing nation, be it Japan, Thailand, the
U.S.S.R. or the U.S.
1. Japan's Access and Cooperation
Japan has been the first country to establish sound cooperation with
the F.F.A. nations. The access fee paid by Japan to Pacific Island coun-
tries averages about 4 percent of the commercial value of the catches. In
addition, Japan provides direct assistance in the forum of technical coop-
eration and financial grants under her fisheries cooperation program
with Pacific Island countries, which for the period 1981-1985 accounted
for more than $10 million in annual contributions.
2. ASEAN Overture
The F.F.A. nations have recently turned to members of the Associa-
tion of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN), comprising Thailand, Malay-
sia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Phillippines, and Brunei Darusalem, as
their good neighbors to the northwest for cooperation. The F.F.A. has
turned especially to Thailand as a distant-water fishing nation, for access
and joint ventures in tuna processing within the region. Cooperation has
been sought from outside the region by the Pacific Island nations for
support in the form of commercial investment in the development of na-
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tional and regional capability in fishing, transhipment and processing,
market access, training and research, and conservation and management
of the region's tuna resources.
3. Soviet Reactions
To this overture, the U.S.S.R. reacted favorably by concluding a fish-
ery treaty with Kiribati after the Jeannette Diana incident in 1984.113 The
Solomon Islands announced in 1984 that she would welcome Soviet par-
ticipation in tuna harvesting in her EEZ, subject to her regulatory con-
trols and payment of access fees. 114 The U.S.S.R. may be said to have
overpaid the access fees for tuna fishing in the South Pacific; however,
the Soviet fishery policy is not purely one of survival but also of eco-
nomic recovery. Tuna could provide a new source of hard currencies
earning for the U.S.S.R. by opening new markets in Asian ports, such as
Singapore. It is clear that the Soviet interests in the commercial exploita-
tion of tuna are justifiable. This does not preclude other political and
strategic interests which could well be served by establishing a toehold in
strategic South Pacific island States, where peace and serenity have thus
far been undisturbed (except by occasional nuclear explosion tests con-
ducted by an out-of-region power to serve its own ambitions, to the utter
amazement of the region if not the entire world).
D. United States Affirmative Response
The initial response by the United States government to collective
enforcement actions by the F.F.A. was disappointing, if not indeed appal-
ling. It is useful to examine the material facts and events leading to the
adoption of stern counter-measures by the United States government
facing lawful collective enforcement sanctions by the South Pacific Island
States escalating a second tuna war that should never been waged be-
tween "civilized nations."
Past record shows that only about 1% of the total tuna catch by
American fishing fleets has come from the U.S. EEZ. 1 5 It is not likely
that foreign fishing fleets could have fished for highly migratory species
within the U.S. FCZ in spite of the disclaimer of United States sover-
eignty or jurisdiction over tuna in the area. If for no other reason, it
would not have had been economically viable for other States to have
done so. This paucity of prospective catch explains more eloquently
than words the reasoning behind the United States' voluntary waiver of
sovereignty over tuna within the U.S. EEZ. By adopting this stance
within her own FCZ, the United States was able to project the appearance
of consistency in her claim that U.S. fishing fleets should enjoy open ac-
cess to large tuna stocks elsewhere around the globe, including those
113 For the Jeannette Diana, see Niugini Nius, Sep. 8, 1984, at 1, and see Jun. 8, 1985, at 10 for
the Kiribati Treaty.
114 The licensing fee is valued at $300,000 per boat as compared to $50,000 per vessel under the
U.S. Treaty. The tuna is valued at $800 per metric ton live weight. The Soviet payments have been
criticized as commercially unrealistic. News Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Honaira, Solomon
Islands (August 22, 1984).
115 Healey, supra note 23, at 87.
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occurring within the EEZ of other coastal States, Southeast and South-
west Pacific alike.
The United States has sought to enforce her position in regard to
highly migratory species in foreign waters through two important legisla-
tion: The Fishermen's Protective Act of 1954116 and the Magnuson Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Magnuson Act).1 17 The
Fishermen's Protective Act provided for compensation by U.S. tuna fish-
ermen whose vessels have been seized for illegally fishing in the fisheries
zones in foreign countries. This amount is reimbursable by the U.S. Sec-
retary of State by deduction from the'foreign assistance granted to that
country.11 This legislation was in response to earlier seizures of U.S.
tuna fishing vessels by Southeast Pacific countries, such as Chile, Ecua-
dor, and Peru during the first U.S. tuna war following the historic Santi-
ago Declaration of 200-mile zone of "mar patrimonial."' 1 9 The
Magnuson Act provides that a foreign fishery conservation zone shall not
be recognized by the United States if such zone fails to accept that highly
migratory species are to be managed by an applicable international fish-
ery agreement. 120 The Act also authorizes the United States government
to impose an embargo on importation of fisheries products from any
country that seizes a U.S. fishing vessel harvesting tuna without a license.
Upon receipt of certification by the Secretary of State to that effect, the
Secretary of Treasury is empowered to take appropriate action to pro-
hibit importation of all fish and fish products, such as highly migratory
species, from the fishery involved, or indeed any other fishery deemed
appropriate. 121 The embargo is virtually automatic.
The. net results of these two Acts in practice encouraged U.S. fisher-
men to violate fisheries regulations of foreign sovereign nations. These
actions might not otherwise have been totally unwarrantable originally in
the fifties and the sixties, when the practice of States on the limits of
exclusive fishery conservation zones was still unsettled, and while U.S.
tuna vessels would be compelled to pay for very costly foreign licenses
and to adhere to.whatever arbitrary or discriminatory regulations were
imposed by the coastal State.122 Sucfi a protective counter-measure
might have been viewed with some sympathy, having regard to the lack
of consistency in the law and the weakness of enforcement capabilities of
Latin American States to protect their own fishing interests within the
200-mile zone, at a time when the territorial sea was conceived to be no
116 Pub. L. No. 90-482, 82 Stat. 729 (1968), especially § 2(a).
117 Pub. L. No. 94-265, Title II, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
118 See, e.g., Meron, The Fishermen's Protective Act: A Case Study in Contemporary Legal Strategy of the
United States, 69 AM.J. INT'L L., 290 (1975).
119 Chile andPeru in 1947, El Salvador in 1950, Honduras in 1951 and Ecuador in 1966. See
Carroz, Les problerhes de la pche dans la convention sur le droit de la mer et la pratique des Etats, LE NOUVEAU
DRorr INTERNATIONAL, 6dition Pedone, 178-229, Annexes at 221-229 (1983).
120 Pub. L. No. 94-265, Title II, § 202(e)(2), 90 Stat. 339 (1976).
121 Id. § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1982).
122 See, e.g., Statement by Theodore Kronmiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and Fisheries Affairs to Congressional Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporation, on
consideration of an amendment to the Magnuson Act 1976, which would have extended the applica-
tion of the Act also to highly migratory species, December 8, 1981 (unpublished); Burke, supra note
23, at 308-09..
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more than three to twelve miles. In this day and age, however, with prac-
tically all coastal States having adopted 200-mile exclusive fishery conser-
vation zones or EEZ's, countermeasures in the form of embargoes
against the island nations in the South Pacific that are exercising their
legitimate sovereign rights and are so heavily dependent on their fishing
industries are an inappropriate response.
The growing tension between the United States and the Pacific Is-
land Forum States culminated in the sanctions and counter sanctions fol-
lowing the arrest of the Danica, an American purse seiner, by Papua New
Guinea fisheries officials in February 1982 for fishing in her EEZ without
a license.123 Embargo was imposed as a retaliatory measure and the Dan-
ica was released for a fee of 200,000 kina. 124 An interim agreement was
concluded allowing access to the American Tunaboat Association under
more favorable conditions than the Japanese purse seiners.
A second dispute concerned the Jeannette Diana, arrested by Solomon
Islands on June 24, 1984 on the charge of illegal fishing in her EEZ. 125
The captain and owner of the fishing vessel were found guilty by the
High Court of Solomon Islands and fined 72,000 Solomon Islands dol-
lars. Harsh counter-measures were exchanged between the United
States and Solomon Islands. U.S. embargo was lifted seven months later
in April, 1985126 following an agreement between the two governments.
The Solomon Islands agreed to return the Jeannette Diana to its owner for
a fee of 770,000 Solomon Island dollars. 127
This intolerable state of affairs could not be allowed to continue
much further. An attempt had to be made to salvage the untenable situa-
tion. The initiative to conclude a fisheries treaty with the South Pacific
island States began as early as 1982, following the Danica incident. The
United States objective would be to conclude a regional treaty after the
model of regional cooperation in the management of migratory species
,with Nauru. 128 U.S. Congressman McCloskey struck the right chord as
he proposed to demonstrate the willingness of the United States to coop-
erate fairly and justly in the conservation and management of interna-
tional fisheries and stocks to encourage reasonable use of such resources
by U.S. fishermen as well as providing assistance to developing island
nations in fisheries conservation, management, harvesting, processing,
123 This was in contravention of § 12 of the Papua New Guinea Fisheries Act, penalties for which
entail a fine not exceeding 1,000 kina, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or
both, on summary conviction, and more on indictment. Cf Tsamenyi, supra note 106, at 37.
124 In 1986, one Kina (Papua New Guinea) was worth $0.97.
125 See Solomon Islands Fisheries Act, containing provisions similar to those of Papua New
Guinea. Cf Tsamenyi, supra note 106, at 37-38.
126 In 1986, one Solomon Islands dollar was worth $0.70.
127 See Niugini Nius, Sep. 8, 1984, at 1; News Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Honaira, Solo-
mon Islands, Aug. 27, 1984.
128 See McCloskey, Statement on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives 4-5, (Mar. 1I,
1982), (unpublished) noted in Tsamenyi, supra note 106, at 40.
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and marketing. 129 This could serve in time to avert further Soviet intru-
sion into an area hitherto near and dear to the United States.130
The Treaty of Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific
Island States (16) and the Government of the United States of America,
with annexes and Agreed Statement was signed on April 2, 1987.131 The
package carries the license fees of $1,750,000 representing 35 licenses of
$50,000 each and $250,000 technical assistance, totalling $2 million a
year payable by the U.S. Tuna Fishery Association. Additionally the
United States government agreed to provide an annual assistance of $10
million for the next five years.' 3 2 In total, this package would represent
about 9% of the $131.8 million estimated commercial value of the
United States tuna catch of 208,000 mt. in the Pacific Islands region in
1984. The actual license fees of $1,750,000 amount to less than 3% of
the total catch value, compared to the average of 4% paid by Japanese
fishermen on top of the assistance furnished by the Japanese government
averaging over $10 million per year during 1981-85.133
This treaty has served to avert what has threatened to be an ugly
tuna war between the United States and a group of micro-polynesian is-
land nations, whose desire for a peaceful world is beyond suspicion. The
treaty is not an end in itself, but merely serves as a positive first step.
The F.F.A. States are traditional friends and allies of the United States.
They pose no threat to anyone and under no circumstances should they
be treated as enemy or competitor. They have the right to survive and
should be encouraged to defend themselves singly as well as collectively.
Their union has proved to be strong enough to be noticeable. Had they
shown less strength, they might have perished. It calls for Statemanship
to recognize and appreciate the value of friendship and relations of coop-
eration, based on give-and-take, and the submergence of short-term ad-
129 Id. at 1. See also the confidential document prepared by the State Department, South Pa-
cific/Solomon Islands: Multilateral Fisheries Negotiations (unpublished), (March 5, 1985), still ad-
hering to the original U.S. position. There is no change in U.S. policy. The lifting of the embargo in
the Jeannette Diana case was "a reinterpretation of administrative practice."
130 McCloskey, supra note 128 at 4-5 ("There is a far greater danger, however, vis-a-vis our con-
tinuing efforts to deny expansion of Soviet influence in the Pacific Basin.. .. Following the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet efforts to count support among these nations were effectively
blocked.")
131 S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-118 (1987).
132 The preambles of the Treaty read:
" The Governments of the Pacific Island States party to this Treaty and the Government
of the United States of America:
Acknowledging that in accordance with international law, coastal states have sovereign
rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the fisheries
resources of their exclusive economic zones or fisheries zones;
Recognizing the strong dependence of the Pacific Island parties on fisheries resources
and the importance of continued abundance of those resources;
Bearing in mind that some species of fish are found within and beyond the jurisdiction
of any of the parties and range throughout a broad region;
Desiring to maximize benefits flowing from the development of the fisheries resources
within the exclusive economic zones or fisheries zones of the Pacific Island Party
Have agreed as follows.
133 See Jioji Kotablavu, Extended Maritime Jurisdiction in the Pacific Maximizing Benefits from
Marine Resources, (paper presented at Law of the Sea Institute, 21st Annual Conference, Honolulu,
Aug. 1987).
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vantages for the big and the strong to the detriment of the smaller and
weaker nations.
What is needed is an ability to see beyond the obvious confrontation
between the two opposing views of sovereignty over highly migratory
species within the EEZ. Whatever the view which will ultimately prevail,
it is not worth alienating the valuable friendship of our neighbors. Con-
gressman McCloskey has put the matter aptly thus:
These South Pacific Nations have, until now, been among our
closest friends and have supported us on many international issues of
great importance. Even now, Fijian troops are maintaining the peace
in troubled Middle East. A continuance of strong arm tactics against a
small country such as Papua New Guinea may endanger long standing
friendships far more valuable to us than a slight increase in tuna costs
through acceptance of licensing fees by our tuna industry.' 34.
V. Conclusion
The conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing presentation ap-
pear irresistible. Peace is global and indivisible. Peace without law is
untenable. Lawless peace is inconceivable. International Ocean Law is
derived from the practice of States. We no longer live in an age when the
big and powerful can dictate for the rest of the world a code of conduct
which they themselves neither can nor care to observe. The days are
long gone when it is considered a privilege for the strong to take what
was not given from the battered weak. Cooperation should supplant
confrontation as the order of the day.
The chance is practically nil if we do not proceed from the basic
proposition that States are under an obligation to cooperate with one
another. Nor can we today afford to deny or ridicule the collective efforts
of peace-loving nations, however poor and meager might be their re-
sources, economic power, or military might.
Fisheries conservation and management provide clear examples of
possible fruitful international cooperation. The possibilities are there to
confront, conciliate, or avoid altogether the competing and conflicting
interests of coastal and other States. The alternatives and options are
open. It is for us to decide.
In this particular connection, Japan offers a most interesting instance
for in-depth study. The new ocean law of extended maritime jurisdiction
has presented a most profound shock to countries like Japan, Korea, and
Thailand, countries whose traditional distant-water fishing grounds have
suddenly shrunk beyond recognition and comprehension. Each nation
has had to fend for herself to find new grounds and alternatives for sur-
vival. Japan has emerged still strong in spite of the multifarious difficul-
ties that stand in the way to survival. It has had to resort to scientific
research and to find alternative solutions through negotiations, joint ven-
tures, and an arduous process of give-and-take.
134 McCloskey, supra note 128, at I ("It is time to abandon our convention that we can control
fishing in our own 200-mile zone while still claiming the right to fish tuna within other nations' 200-
mile zones."). Cf Tsamenyi, supra note 106, at 37 n.41.
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In the North Pacific, the United States stands out as the grand cham-
pion, winning the admiration and gratitude of other strong and powerful
nations, acting on the principle of the new ocean law, permitting the ex-
tension of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and its exploitation to
the fullest optimum limits. The phasing out of foreign fishing, including
the Soviet, the Japanese, the Korean, the Polish and the Chinese, has
been orderly, well-planned and executed without major disruptions. In
the meantime, the U.S. fishing industry in all its splendor, researching,
harvesting, processing and marketing, is thus enabled to grow from
strength to strength. Other less fortunate coastal States like Japan, Ko-
rea and Thailand have not fared so well. They have had to look to other
alternative solutions with varying degrees of success to date. Their U.S.
partners and Soviet counterparts are enjoying a relatively comfortable
respite in the commercial exploitation of their fisheries.
For the North Pacific region, the ocean law has been kindly and per-
missive, allowing coastal States to regulate fisheries within their exclusive
economic zones. The United States has proved to be a principal if not
unique beneficiary of progressive development of the law. When the
same legal developments were about to occur in the South Pacific region,
however, the United States showed hesitancy in acknowledging the legiti-
mate rights and aspirations of the Pacific Island nations. The reappear-
ance of the Japanese and the emergence of the Soviet in the Southwest
Pacific have been a blessing in disguise, an eye-opener in a way for those
whose vision has been temporarily beclouded by short-term advantages.
Indeed, the same rule of international ocean law is applicable to all
nations alike. None can be heard to be the overload law-giver, as the
process of international law-making has been taken from the monopoly
of the European and Western Powers into the rightful hands of all na-
tions, large and small, rich and poor, regardless of their economic or
political structures. The Pacific Island States have joined the community
of nations, accepting customary rules of the law of the sea as they exist,
and have since taken active part in the process of their modification and
progressive development to respond more effectively to the exigencies of
the new international economic order, under which international rela-
tions are conducted on the basis of equal sovereignty and dignity. Gone
are the days when colonialists clung to the maxim "pacta sunt servanda"
as a sacred formula for perpetuating their colonial gains. Unequal trea-
ties are today void ab initio without consequence. Peremptory norms of
international law have swept away unfounded claims of illicit promises
that offend the conscience of mankind. The law is in every nation's hand
and not, as it were, in the hands of the mighty and powerful nations of
the West.
A practice which may have been expedient at one time for a particu-
lar location, such as the Fishermen Protective Act, to protect United
States fishermen in the East Pacific region has no application to another
region which is differently composed, especially at a time when the
emerging legal developments have recognized the legitimate rights of
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the Pacific Island States. Law is intertemporal. Its untimely application
is out of place apart from being out of time.
Reason must ultimately prevail whatever duration of time it may take
to persuade those who have been spoiled by the outdated rules of inter-
national customs permitting subjugation of the weak and the conquered
by the mighty and the ruthless. Reason is stronger than armed forces.
Material gains are no match for friendship and the love of peace.
The greatness of man, or State, is not measured by his capacity to
induce mass destruction, nor indeed by his constructive or productive
potentials, but rather by his ability to endure the hardships and suffer-
ings that mankind is called upon to face. The magnanimity of man lies in
his endurance, tolerance, and sacrifices, so that others too may live in
peace, progress, and prosperity.
The time has come for the United States to take her rightful place as
a leader of the free nations of the world in the codification and the pro-
gressive development of the law of the sea. United States interests in the
ocean realm would best be served by her re-entry into the mainstream of
international legal developments. The community of nations needs the
participation of the United States in its collective endeavors and coopera-
tive efforts. The international community urgently needs a dedicated
and responsible leader like the United States, a major maritime-oriented
nation, who is able, willing, and ever ready to undertake and implement
obligations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The
United States is second to none in her contributions to the scientific pro-
gress and economic developments for the well-being and betterment of
mankind. The active role of the United States in the conclusion of the
Fisheries Treaty with the South Pacific State in April 1987 marks a signifi-
cant step in the right direction. The treaty in its resounding preamble
acknowledges the sovereign rights of every State to regulate fisheries in
its own exclusive economic zones. This is indeed an opportune signal to
herald a new era of active meaningful cooperation and good neighborli-
ness among nations, and indeed a welcome return to international law
and order. The greatest attribute of the United States is reflected in her
flexible attitude and her ability to alter her policy course to respond
more effectively to the pressing needs of the contemporary world. The
balance thus struck may be happily maintained for the common good of
all for years to come.
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Annex I: The United States' Exclusive Economic Zone
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Annex II: The South Pacific, Possible Exclusive Economic Zones
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